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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the impact of the Navy's fully-funded graduate education
program on Surface Warfare Officer performance. Three measures of officer
performance are used: (1) probability of promotion to 0-4; (2) percent of all LT
FITREPs recommended for early promotion; and (3) the probability of receiving
an early promotion recommendation on the last LT FITREP. Navy Officer Master
Files (FY1981 through FY1990), created by Prof. William Bowman, USNA, are
merged with NPRDC's Officer FITREP Files to statistically analyze performance
differences between Surface Warfare Officers with and without fully-funded
graduate education. Ordinary least squares and non-linear maximum likelihood
techniques are used to estimate the three performance models. Since selection into
the fully-funded program is not random, an attempt is made to model the selection
process and to correct for the potential bias in the estimated coefficient of graduate
education in the performance models. The findings reveal that fully-funded
graduate education has a significant positive impact on the probability ofpromotion
to 0-4, but insignificant effects on receiving early promotion recommendations on
LT FITREPs. Additionally, selectivity does not appear to bias estimates of fully-
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Graduate education is both a noble idea, and an ongoing
necessity that enhances the quality leadership essential
for the United States Navy. I believe graduate education
is one of the tools absolutely required for officers who
will face growing complexities in technological,
managerial and political/economic fields in the Navy.
Even in this era of fiscal austerity and competing
requirements placed upon our junior officers, investment
in graduate education must be pursued as a priority. [Ref
.
l:p. 6]
-- ADM Frank B. Kelso, II, Chief of Naval Operations, on
graduate education policy.
A. BACKGROUND
Today's highly competitive economic environment, combined
with a rapid rate of technological advancement, has placed new
emphasis on smaller, yet more productive labor forces in both
civilian and military organizations. Graduate education has
emerged as a viable means to "retool" mid- grade managers and
officers with the required knowledge and skills to succeed in
this challenging and rapidly changing environment.
As the value of graduate education for both the employer
and the recipient continues to increase, and in light of the
current reductions in Navy officer end strength and defense
appropriations, it is important to estimate the true value of
graduate education to both the Navy and the recipient. The
theory of human capital investment, discussed in detail in
Chapter II, suggests that formal education increases
productivity and earnings of an individual over time. In the
civilian labor force, returns to education may be measured by
increased earnings. In the military, returns to education may
be measured by increased earnings as a result of promotion
(which is infrequent) , and with length of service within
grade. Thus, changes in productivity can be measured by
changes in performance within and across rank, and
alternatively by longer job tenure - or years of service - as
a measure of an additional contribution to the Navy. [Ref . 2]
This study analyzes the impact of graduate education that
is fully- funded by the Navy on Surface Warfare Officers (SWO)
utilizing two measures of performance: promotion to
Lieutenant Commander (0-4) and performance on Lieutenant
fitness reports (FITREPS) . Two aspects of the LT FITREPs are
used: (1) the percent recommended for early promotion (RAP)
,
and (2) whether or not the final LT FITREP (just prior to the
0-4 selection board) receives an early promotion
recommendation. The focus here is on job performance, rather
than job tenure, as the latter is no longer critical to the
Navy in an environment of reduced end strength.
The officer data file used in this thesis is based on the
Officer Promotion History Data File (FY's 1981 through 1990)
obtained from Dr. William R. Bowman of the U.S. Naval Academy
(USNA) , and the Officer Fitness Report Files from the Naval
Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) , San Diego.
Figure 1, which is derived from these two data sources,
reveals that Surface Warfare officers with fully- funded
graduate education (FFGE) , when compared to all other SWOs,
were promoted 17 percentage points higher, received 10 percent
more recommendations for early promotion on all LT fitness
reports, and were 5 percent more likely to receive an early
promotion recommendation on the last LT FITREP.
PROMOTION TO 0-4 AND LT F1TREPS RAPPED
FYSB 85-90
PROMOnON PERCENT RAF LASTLTRAP
FFQE OTHER
Figure 1. Promotion, and LT fitrep performance
distribution of fully- funded graduate educated
versus all other Surface Warfare Officers (FY 85-
90) .
Source: USNA and NPRDC.
The question that remains to be answered is how much of
these differences in performance between graduate educated and
non- graduate educated SWOs is due to:
1. An increase in productivity attributed to graduate
education and the increased stock of human capital;
2. Observed demographic characteristics, undergraduate
experience, or Navy experience;
3. Unobserved factors accounting for the fact that officers
selected for graduate education are already established
as top performers and are inherently more promotable due
to motivation, innate ability, desire for achievement,
contacts, health, attitudes, and interests. 1
To fully understand the implications of graduate education
on performance, one must first understand the various graduate
education opportunities afforded Naval officers and the
requirements for each. Officers who attend graduate school
full-time under any partially or fully- funded program of 26
weeks or more are considered funded. Funded programs are
limited to providing sufficient officers with subspecialties
to fill validated billet requirements. Officers may pursue
fully- funded graduate education at the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS) , Monterey, CA or at selected Department of
Defense (DOD) and civilian institutions (CIVINS) . [Ref . 3]
The officer receives full pay and allowances with the majority
of tuition and other schooling costs being assumed or paid by
the Navy. The officer attends school instead of performing
usual military duties. [Ref. 4] The officer agrees to
obligate himself or herself to active duty equal to a period
three times the length of education through the first year and
one month for each month thereafter. Officers receiving
fully- funded degrees are required to serve one tour in a
1 As discussed in more detail below, a major problem with
estimating returns to graduate education is the "selection bias"
that results from individuals who self -select and/or are selected
by the Navy for graduate education, who would later be more likely
to promote even in the absence of graduate education.
validated subspecialty position as soon as possible but not
later than the second tour following graduation. [Ref. 3]
In a partially funded program, the officer receives full
pay and allowances with the majority of tuition and other
schooling costs paid by the officer. As with the fully- funded
program, the officer attends school instead of performing
usual military duties, incurs the same active duty obligation,
and is to serve in a validated subspecialty tour within the
same period. [Ref. 4]
Graduate education through the tuition assistance (T/A)
program is pursued by the officer during off-duty time while
receiving full pay and allowances. The officer receives 75
percent of tuition costs from the Navy for one degree program
only, which is based on a certain amount of money per credit
hour and is capped on an annual basis. This program allows
the officer to choose his/her area of study and incurs a two
year obligation upon completion. [Ref. 5]
Unfunded graduate education is pursued by the officer
during off-duty time and all costs are incurred by the
officer. No additional active duty obligation is incurred and
an officer may or may not receive a validated subspecialty.
Officers are free to pursue any area of study desired. [Ref.
4]
B . OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to obtain accurate
estimates of the impact of fully- funded graduate education on
two measures of performance, promotion to 0-4 and LT FITREP
performance, broken down into the percentage of all LT fitness
reports recommended for early promotion and whether the last
LT FITREP receives an early promotion recommendation for
Surface Warfare officers. Utilizing multivariate modeling
techniques, the intention is to isolate performance
differences between SWOs with and without fully- funded
graduate education, and to apply standard techniques to
correct the estimates for selection bias. The ability to test
and correct for potential selectivity bias associated with
graduate education selection depends on how effective the
selection model is in its predictions.
The Navy's investment in fully- funded graduate education
is significant. In 1994, the annual cost for fully- funded
graduate education programs is projected to ve approximately
$174. 5M. [Ref. 5] The results of this analysis will address
what the payoff is to the Navy from its significant investment
in graduate education, and whether or not removing an officer
from the surface warfare environment to obtain a graduate
education is career- enhancing to the officer.
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The data set used to define the research population,
originally created by Professor William': R. Bowman of the Naval
Academy, contained all officers going before the promotion
selection board for Lieutenant (0-3) between fiscal years 1981
and 1985 and Lieutenant Commander board (0-4) between fiscal
years 1985 and 1990. This data set is merged with fitness
report files (supplied by NPRDC) to allow the researcher to
track an officer's performance from the time of commissioning
through selection to 0-4, or until the officer separated from
the Navy.
Due to differences in how different communities evaluate
officers, and sharp differences in career paths between
communities, only one Unrestricted Line (URL) community was
chosen as the subject of this research effort. The Surface
Warfare Officer (SWO) community was chosen because of its
highly structured career path and the fact that SWOs comprise
a majority of URL officers.
To ensure there were no missing values for any variables,
only SWOs with complete data on all variables used in the
regression models were included in the analysis. 2 Officers
transferring into the SWO community were included in the
analysis because most of these transitions occur very early in
one's career, and well before the LT selection board.
This process resulted in only 283 observations, or 15
percent, of the original sample being excluded from the study.
Officers leaving the SWO community were not included in the




In an effort to maintain consistent measures of the impact
of graduate education on performance and due to the fact that
officers with fully- funded graduate education comprise 84
percent of all those with graduate education in the sample,
the "treatment group" is restricted to only those officers
with fully- funded graduate educations. Considering the
significant investment incurred by the Navy in providing
fully- funded graduate education, restricting the treatment
group to those with fully- funded education (FFGE) will focus
on the group with the greatest importance to graduate
education policy makers. Since Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) graduates constitute 96 percent of all FFGE's in the
sample, NPS and FFGE may be considered synonymous in this
study.
The Master Loss File is available in the data, but nearly
all who left the Navy prior to the LCDR selection board did
not have fully- funded graduate degrees. Because fully- funded
graduate degree recipients incur an additional obligation
averaging four years, it was decided not to attempt to analyze
retention behavior. However, officers deciding to remain in
the Navy beyond initial obligation may differ systematically
3 This resulted in ;„ only 147 observations that were excluded
from the study.
from those choosing to leave. The factors that are associated
with these differences could be important to performance and
promotion. This separation decision is considered an
important level of selection prior to the 0-4 promotion board
and it is analyzed in the appendix.
Three performance measures are used in this thesis:
1. probability of promotion to 0-4;
2
.
percent of all LT FITREPs receiving an early promotion
recommendation;
3. probability of receiving an early promotion
recommendation on the last LT FITREP.
This thesis analyzes promotion and whether the last LT FITREP
receives a recommendation for early promotion (RAP) in a
binary fashion utilizing nonlinear regression (logit) models.
The measure of the percent of all LT FITREPS that receive
"RAPs" is analyzed in a linear fashion utilizing an ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression technique.
Selection for fully- funded graduate education is modeled
in a binary fashion utilizing a nonlinear, maximum likelihood
(probit) estimating procedure. This statistical technique
produces estimates of the likelihood of graduate education
selection for each officer in the sample. The contention that
officers selected for graduate education are inherently more
productive and perform at a higher level suggests that there
are some unobserved (unmeasurable) factors related to
performance outcomes. Multivariate regression analysis
captures these unobservables in an error term. If a
significant correlation exists between this error term and the
graduate education independent variable, the estimates of the
impact of graduate education on officer performance will be
"biased. " In this case, the presence of selectivity bias
could cause the estimated coefficient of graduate education to
overestimate its true impact on the three performance
measures
.
In order to obtain accurate estimates of graduate
education, two different procedures -- referred to as "the
Heckman" and "the Barnow" approaches -- are used to correct
for potential selectivity bias in the measures of performance.
Critical to the effectiveness of these procedures is the
assumption that selection for graduate education is not random
and the degree of success associated with the ability to
accurately predict selection will determine if selectivity
bias is important. These procedures will be discussed in more
detail in Chapters II and III below.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter II
reviews pertinent literature and previous studies relevant to
human capital investment theory, military promotion, the use
of fitness reports as measures of performance, and selectivity
bias. Chapter III describes the data sets used in the thesis
and discusses the specification of the various multivariate
models to be estimated. Chapter IV presents the empirical
10
results of bivariate and multivariate analyses of the models.
Chapter V summarizes the results, and provides conclusions and
recommendations on further research. '•
11
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter includes reviews of relevant previous
research efforts in four different areas relevant to this
thesis. These areas include: human capital investment
theory, research on personnel promotion, research on officer
performance (FITREPs) , and analyses of selectivity bias.
The costs and benefits associated with an investment in
graduate education can be sizable for both the provider and
recipient. Although the Navy incurs much of the monetary cost
for fully- funded programs, there are non-monetary costs that
the officer must weigh in his or her decision to pursue
graduate education. Human capital investment theory provides
a framework for identifying the relevant costs and benefits.
Previous research on assessing the impact of graduate
education on employee promotion and performance is extremely
limited. Two studies of promotion were chosen for the
literature review in this chapter on the basis of relevance
and similarities to independent variables used in this thesis.
Other research efforts on performance that utilized fitness
reports are also reviewed because they provide the basis for
the development of the FITREP performance indexes used in this
thesis. Finally, given that potential selectivity bias is an
underlying theme throughout this thesis, it is important to
12
define the nature and the effects of selectivity in the
analysis of graduate education, and how it can be accounted
for in statistical models of officer performance.
A. HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT THEORY
Capital investments, by definition, entail an initial cost
that the investor hopes to recoup over some future period of
time. Traditionally, capital investments were considered in
terms of nonhuman assets such as, land, buildings, and
machinery. However, a relatively new use of "human capital"
has given investment a new meaning. Human capital investments
include such activities as education, job training, and
migration. 4 All three incur initial costs and are made with
the expectation that the investment will pay off well into the
future in the form of higher productivity (and therefore
earnings) , reduced job turnover, and increased job
satisfaction. [Ref . 6] For the purposes of this study, only
one type of human capital investment will be discussed, that
of formal education.
4 Human capital investment in education incur initial costs
to the employer (provider) through tuition and forgone productivity
by the employee during education.
Human capital investment in job training intends to provide
increased skills to workers, resulting in higher
productivity/earnings
.
Human capital investment in migration refers to voluntary
(job quitting) and involuntary lay-offs. Costs incurred by the
employee are induced by earnings lost during the search for new
employment and relocation. [Ref. 6]
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This thesis concentrates on the Navy's investment in its
fully- funded graduate education program. The increased
knowledge and skills associated with graduate education
represent an increase in the recipient's stock of productive
capital. In the civilian labor market, an increase in one's
human capital is typically measured by an increase in
earnings, as more precise data on individual productivity is
not available. [Ref. 6] In the military, individual
performance can be measured, which allows the researcher to
estimate more clearly the returns to human capital compared to
the multitude of human capital research in the civilian labor
market
.
Three main elements of human capital investment theory are
central to this study: (1) whether the training (or
education) is specific or general; (2) the means of
financing; (3) and the timing of the investment. First,
human capital investments in graduate education may be general
or specific in nature. General education (or training)
increases an individual's productivity to many employers
equally, including the Navy, whereas specific education
increases an individual's productivity only to the Navy (or
the firm in which he or she is currently employed) . [Ref. 6]
The majority of course work in a civilian master's degree in
Business Administration (MBA) is general in nature due to its
value to a wide variety of employers. Certain required
courses within the Navy's fully- funded graduate education
14
programs, not available in civilian graduate programs, are
designed by Navy sponsors and are "firm specific" to the Navy.
These military courses may lessen the ^attractiveness of the
program to private sector employers compared to civilian
graduate programs. Further more, some fully- funded graduate
programs, like Ant i- Submarine Warfare offered at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) is wholly specific to the Navy. In
general, curricula offered through the Navy's fully- funded
programs emphasize specific naval applications, but as with
any accredited academic institution, a plethora of subjects
taken by the students are general in nature. To the extent
that a graduate degree has general components, the recipient
becomes more marketable for lucrative civilian job
opportunities. Since the individual's potential civilian wage
rises, a graduate degree tends to increase his or her
probability of leaving the Navy. To offset this, the Navy
imposes an additional service obligation accompanying a fully-
funded graduate education. This binds the individual to the
Navy and ensures that the Navy receives some return on its
investment. 5
The second element central to this study is the means of
financing the graduate education investment. For education
that is general in nature, the increase in an employee's
The return is in the form of having a more "productive"
officer fill specialized billets and in reducing turnover costs




marginal productivity after graduate education forces firms to
pay a wage equal to or greater than the value of the increased
productivity. Otherwise, the employee will choose to work for
another firm willing to pay the higher wage. Since most
graduate education programs contain both general and specific
elements, costs incurred by the employer play an essential
role in the decision to provide graduate education
opportunities. Consequently, either firms will not offer
graduate education, or will force the employees to bear a
portion of the education costs by paying them wages below the
marginal product (by an amount equal to the education cost) in
the post -education period. [Ref. 6] Figure 2 illustrates
this marginal product/earnings relationship.
In contrast to the dilemma faced by civilian firms, the
military is somewhat unique in that it can pay the full cost
of graduate education and recover the investment through
extended service obligations, during which the service member
is paid the same pre -graduate education wage. In economic
terms, the military is able to acquire a "surplus" by paying
the officer a wage less than the value of his or her gain in
marginal productivity. On the other hand, there is an
indirect cost, commonly referred to as "opportunity cost,
"
suffered by the military through foregone productivity of the
officer in the fleet during graduate education. The military
is willing to fund graduate education only if the increased
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A * VMPl < Earnings (coat)
B - VMPl > Eamiap (return*
Figure 2 . Value of Marginal Productivity and
Earnings as related to graduate education.
marginal cost in terms of foregone productivity and direct
outlays. [Ref. 6]
Individual officers pursue fully- funded graduate education
in part because the monetary cost of the education is paid by
the Navy, and in part because they anticipate greater returns
in the future through enhanced promotion opportunities in the
Navy and/or a more competitive position in the civilian job
market at the end of their obligation. Although these are
attractive benefits, the officer also incurs an opportunity
cost; foregone knowledge, training, and additional
qualifications that might be gained if he or she instead chose
to remain within the warfare environment. Many officers fear
17
the possibility of "falling behind" their peers while removed
from the high-paced, competitive, operational warfare
environment
.
The third and final element of human capital investment
theory central to this study is the timing of the investment.
In theory, greater returns from human capital investments are
realized the earlier the investment is undertaken. Providing
graduate education early in an officer's career, assuming that
he/she remains in the service for an extended period of time,
affords the Navy a longer period of time to recover the
investment. [Ref. 7] A condition of the fully- funded
graduate education program is that officers serve a
utilization tour within their subspecialty, attained through
graduate education, no more than two years after graduation.
This tour is called a "payback" due to its vital role played
in recovering the Navy's investment. This requirement is
difficult to enforce due to the highly structured time-
sensitive URL career paths, especially within the Surface
Warfare community. Consequently, the earlier the officer
receives the subspecialty code, the more likely he or she will
serve a utilization tour sometime in their career. On the
other hand, learned knowledge of a specific specialty will
depreciate over time if not applied. So, it is in both the
18
Navy's and the officer's best interest to serve a payback tour
as soon as possible. 6
B. RESEARCH ON PERSONNEL PROMOTION
The first study reviewed is D.J. Cymrot's, "Graduate
Education and the Promotion of Officers," which attempted to
assess the benefit to the Navy of providing graduate education
to its officers in terms of its impact on promotion. Graduate
education may provide an officer with technical or general
information that better enables him to handle greater
responsibilities commensurate with higher rank. If graduate-
educated officers get promoted faster, and to higher ranks
than other officers, this supports the contention that
graduate education increases productivity within the
organization. [Ref. 2]
Cymrot begins by deriving a formula to calculate the
marginal benefit to the Navy of providing graduate education
to officers. He identified three factors affecting the
marginal benefit:
• the productivity of the base- case officer,
• the difference in the probability of promotion to the next
rank in each year,
See Bowman [Ref. 5] for a proposal to reduce graduate
education human capital depreciation by separating the timing of
the general education portion from the firm- specif ic portion of
fully- funded graduate education in the Navy.
19
the change in the productivity between ranks (i.e.,
associated with promotion)
.
The marginal benefit is the increase in productivity (or the
marginal product of an officer) that results from graduate
education. Cymrot assumes that productivity depends entirely
on the officer's rank. The base-case officer is defined as an
officer in the lowest rank (LT with 8 years of service) . An
index of productivity at each rank equals the ratio of the
marginal product of a given rank to the marginal product of
the base-case officer. [Ref. 2]
The data used in the analysis was an extract from the
Officer Master File (OMF) , comprising a historical cross
section of all officers on duty in March 1985. The data was
restricted to officers at certain lengths of service and ranks
to avoid having the results affected by officers with atypical
careers, such as enlisted personnel or warrant officers
admitted to the officer corps, or staff officers who enter the
service above the rank of Ensign.
The probabilities of promotion are obtained by a logistic
model, since the dependent variable (promote, not promote) is
limited to values of 1 or 0. Three types of explanatory
variables are used in the promotion model: personal
characteristics (graduate degree, age, sex, race) ; previous
experience and performance indicators (time in rank, service
continuity); and Navy structural variables (officer's
community)
. Since promotability is one of the criteria used
20
in determining whether an officer is allowed to obtain
graduate education, potential selectivity bias exists due to
the correlation between the dependent variable (promote) and
assignment to the experimental group (graduate educated
officers) . Two variables, time- in- rank (capturing promotion
rates) and service continuity (identifying breaks in service)
,
are used by Cymrot in an attempt to control for potential
observed selectivity bias . These two performance and
experience variables are intended to account for some of the
inherent differences in productivity associated with
individual's selected for graduate education, which should be
isolated from the measure of graduate education itself. [Ref
.
2]
Cymrot examined four promotion points by creating
subsamples by length of service (LOS) groupings for Lieutenant
to Lieutenant Commander, Lieutenant Commander to Commander,
Commander to Captain, and Captain to Flag. The impact of
graduate education is positive and statistically significant
in all groups except promotion to Flag officer. The fact that
this result persisted even with the experience and performance
indicators (time- in- rank, and service continuity) included in
the model (to account for selection) , supports the contention
that graduate education does raise productivity by increasing
the likelihood of promotion to the next higher rank. In fact,
graduate education increased the probability of promotion to
Lieutenant Commander by 26 percent, to Commander by 10.6
21
percent, and to Captain by 16.5 percent. It is interesting to
note that promotion to Flag is conditional on previous
promotion rates, all of which are positively related to having
graduate education. Consequently, it is somewhat puzzling why
graduate education is not significant in promotion to Flag.
One reason might be if an officer is slow in getting promoted
in the lower ranks, chances are, he/she never made it to
Commander or Captain and since those up for Flag have already
undergone a great deal of selection, they represent the best
the Navy has and graduate education may seem unimportant by
that time. [Ref. 2]
The time- in- rank performance variable consistently had
negative and statistically significant coefficients, meaning
that excessive time spent in previous ranks decreases the
current probability of promotion. The positive and
statistically significant effect of the service continuity
experience variable conflicted with the hypothesis that a
break in service would have a negative effect on productivity
and would, thus, decrease the likelihood of promotion. This
surprising result may be due to a large majority of those
officers who leave and then reenter being above - average in
terms of ability and performance.
Other significant factors in Cymrot's model were:
age had a significantly positive impact on promotion,
meaning older officers (possibly due to prior enlisted
service) are more likely to promote than younger ones;
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unrestricted line officers were significantly more likely
to promote than Staff or Restricted Line, but only for the
Lieutenant to Lieutenant Commander LOS group; and
lencrth of service was significantly^positive in all cases.
[Ref. 2]
Cymrot then separated the sample by each successive length
of service year in an attempt to determine whether graduate
education leads to early promotion or whether it is only a
guarantee of eventual promotion. Separate logit models were
run on the probability of promotion for each year. The
results are most striking at the eight year point, at which
graduate education increases the probability of early
promotion to Lieutenant Commander by nearly 60 percent. The
effects for the remaining years are relatively small,
concluding that graduate education ensures only eventual
promotion after the eighth year of service. [Ref. 2]
In summary, Cymrot certainly established a positive
relationship between promotion and graduate education.
However, it is unlikely that he captured the "true" impact of
graduate education on promotion. Since promotability is a
criteria for graduate education selection, the presence of
selectivity bias is probably much more of a potential problem
than he had thought. The issue of what exactly makes these
officers, selected for graduate education, more promotable
must be addressed.
There were two ways in which Cymrot should have dealt with
graduate education selection bias: (1) introduce previously
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excluded observed (measurable) factors as "proxies" to capture
the selection process; and (2) utilize established statistical
techniques to capture unobserved (unmeasurable) factors
effecting selection. His attempt to account for inherent
promotability with "proxies" to capture previous promotion
rates (time -in -rank) and breaks in previous service is not
adequate to fully explain graduate education selection.
Promotability is not the only criteria used in selection;
professional performance within rank, which may be captured
through fitness reports, and academic experience are other
factors that need to be addressed. When dealing with
selection bias, it is necessary to account for all observed
and unobserved factors contributing to selection into the
"treatment group" (graduate educated officers) . Cymrot failed
to account for unobserved factors that contribute to selection
bias. There are established statistical procedures that can
be used to model the process of self -selection and to
eliminate any biases caused by it.
A second study looked at promotion probabilities
exclusively for Surface Warfare Officers. Joseph Nolan in his
NPS Master's thesis, "An Analysis of Surface Warfare Officer
Measures of Effectiveness as Related to Commissioning Source,
Undergraduate Education, and Navy Training, " developed
multivariate models to estimate the determinants of three
measures of effectiveness (MOE's) for Surface Warfare Officers
(SWO) : retention, ' promotion, and early professional
24
qualifications. Performance differences by commissioning
source and quality of undergraduate education are specifically
highlighted. [Ref. 8]
An updated version of the Naval Officer Promotion History
Data File, derived from the Navy Officer Master Files, and
extracts from the Navy Officer Loss Files were obtained by
Nolan from Dr. William Bowman of the U.S. Naval Academy.
These files included background, experience, selection board
results, and separation information for all officers reaching
Lieutenant selection boards between fiscal years 1981 through
1985 and Lieutenant Commander selection boards between fiscal
years 1985 through 1990. Navy training information was
provided by the Naval Personnel Research and Development
Center, San Diego, in its TRAINTRACK System Files. The final
merged promotion data set was restricted to Surface Warfare
Officers remaining within the community to the Lieutenant
Commander selection board and to those obtaining a commission
through USNA, ROTC, or OCS . [Ref. 8]
The independent variables used by Nolan to measure the
likelihood of promotion to 0-4 were grouped into four
categories: (1) personal demographics (sex, race, dependents,
age at commissioning, prior enlisted service, commissioning
source) ; (2) undergraduate education (major, GPA, college
selectivity, academic profile code) ; (3) Navy experience
(service schools, duty stations, billets, additional
qualifications, warfare designation) ; and (4) Navy training
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(academic setback, skill progression training, functional
training). In the promotion model, the effects of Navy-
training are measured indirectly via a variable indicating
attainment of early qualifications prior to the 0-3 selection
board. The goal was to determine whether a correlation
existed between attainment of early qualifications and
promotion to 0-4. The sample is further broken down by
quality of undergraduate college (low, medium, and high) to
determine differences in promotion probabilities based on
college academic rank. Rankings were obtained from Barron's
Profiles of American Colleges. [Ref. 8]
The promotion model was estimated for a pooled sample
consisting of all commissioning sources and college
selectivity levels and then separately by commissioning source
and by college selectivity level. The results were as
follows:
(a) Significant positive effects on promotion to 0-4
were obtained for the following variables: early
professional qualifications, high GPA, high technical
qualification code (TQC) , Engineering Officer of the Watch
qualified, Tactical Action Officer qualified, Department
Head School graduate, served in a combat systems officer
department head billet, and served as operations officer
(NTDS) department head.
(b) Significant negative effects were obtained for
being single, age at commissioning, and being male. It
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should be noted however, that males constituted 9 8 percent




(c) Of the variables with the largest positive impact,
Department Head School graduates were 28 percent more
likely to promote, Combat Systems Officers 7 percent more
likely, Operations Officers (NTDS) 10 percent more likely,
and those with Tactical Action Officer qualification 8
percent more likely.
(d) Variables with negative impacts revealed that
males were 20 percent less likely to promote, minorities,
although insignificant, were 4 percent less likely to
promote than whites, and there was no significant
difference between commissioning source and school
selectivity. [Ref. 8]
In the three promotion model specifications divided by
low, medium, and high college quality, graduation from
Department Head School was the only variable significantly
positive across all three categories. Commissioning source is
significant only in the highly selective category, where ROTC
reveals a negative impact on promotion to 0-4. Significant
positive effects from early qualifications is present in both
the high and medium selectivity groups. Department head
billet type was significant only in the medium selective
category. In the low- college quality category, only
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Department Head School graduate was positively significant in
predicting promotion to 0-4. [Ref. 8]
Two other measures of effectiveness, early professional
qualification, and retention, were also estimated using
nonlinear logit models. Early professional qualification
indicated whether or not an officer earned Additional
Qualification Designators (AQD's) as a Surface Warfare
Officer, Engineering Officer of the Watch, or Officer of the
Deck (underway) . The results indicate the following:
officers with just one dependent were 28 percent more likely
to attain early qualifications compared to single officers;
OCS and ROTC graduates were 5 percent and . 1 percent less
likely to attain early professional qualifications compared to
USNA graduates, respectively; white officers were 7 percent
more likely than minorities to attain early qualifications;
officers with more than one sea tour were 13 percent more
likely than those with just one sea tour; officers with an
academic setback or dropout from a Navy school were 9 percent
less likely than those without; and an officer with more
functional or skill progression training days is more likely
to attain early qualifications than one with less days. In
the model specifications divided by college quality,
functional training days was the only variable significant
across all three groups, and had a positive impact. [Ref. 8]
Retention was defined as whether or not an officer
remained in the service up to the 0-4 promotion board.
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Explanatory variables including high GPA, high TQC, technical
major, and age at commissioning all had significant positive
effects on retention. Variables with significant negative
effects included white, OCS graduate, ROTC graduate, high
quality college, academic setback/attrition, and prior
enlisted service. When analyzed by college quality, only two
variables were significant across all three categories. Age
at commissioning had a significant positive effect on
retention and ROTC graduate was negative when compared to USNA
in the high quality category, positive when compared to OCS in
the medium, and negative compared to OCS in the low category.
[Ref. 8]
It can be concluded from these results that background
factors play a significant role in explaining MOE attainment.
Given the significance of training investments for graduates
of medium and low-quality colleges in their MOE attainment,
future budget cuts in Navy training will affect these two
groups the most.
In light of significant differences in promotion
probabilities in the pooled model, there are important policy
implications to be gained from Nolan's results. The results
seem to support the hypothesis that promotion to 0-4 is highly
dependent on attainment of Department Head school and key
qualifications. Although multivariate analysis of promotion
across college quality failed to reveal much, bivariate
analysis determined that OCS commissioned officers in the high
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college quality category had promotion rates 6 and 12
percentage points higher than the medium and low quality
categories, respectively. The significance of the early
professional qualifications variable may be valuable in
formulating future force downsizing policies in that it
provides a measure of effectiveness at the three year point in
predicting selection to the career force. [Ref. 8]
C. RESEARCH ON OFFICER FITREPS
The report on the fitness of officers (FITREP) is the
major document used for periodic internal evaluation of the
performance of naval officers. FITREPs provide information to
the Navy that is important for promotion, billet assignment,
and retention. [Ref. 9] FITREPs also provide information on
performance within rank, which is one of the criteria used in
measuring an individuals productivity within the military.
Most Commanding Officers (CO's) complete FITREPS with two
purposes in mind: promotion potential, and command- related
selection decisions. However, CO's have expressed a conflict
between their obligation to identify average (or less than
average) performers and their obligation to write FITREPS that
will not destroy an officer's chance for promotion.
Consequently, most junior officers tend to be ranked in the
top 1 percent regardless if they deserve to be there or not.
This quandary is commonly referred to as "grade inflation.
"
The recurring problems of grade inflation, also referred to as
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the "halo effect, " have led to questions of usefulness of
FITREPs in selecting officers for promotion and assignment.
However, there are a few elements on FITREPs with sufficient
variability to support the belief of selection boards that the
FITREP is an adequate indicator of an officer's promotability
and potential for command. [Ref . 9]
A study by Idell Neumann of the Navy Personnel Research
and Development Center (NPRDC) , San Diego, developed a
performance index derived from officer fitness reports. The
index was to be used to expand the scope of the Naval Academy
selection system by including predictions of officer
performance in the fleet after graduation. Her goal was to
establish a relationship among existing admission criteria
with the performance index and then develop predictors of
officer performance for applicants to be used as part of the
selection criteria. [Ref. 10]
The data for the development of the performance index
consisted of all Naval Academy graduates from 19 79 through
1982 in the Surface, Submarine, and Air warfare communities.
These specific year groups were chosen because these officers
had (at that time) at least 4 years of commissioned service
with officer fitness records, available USNA admission
information and performance scores, and response data for
criteria used in the USNA admission program. Including
several year groups also helped to account for possible
differences across USNA graduating classes. The data set for
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the analysis consisted of background information provided by
the Naval Academy, which was merged with officer fitness
report information available from NPRDC files. [Ref . 10]
In order to maintain consistency across all fitness
reports, FITREPs were included for pay grades 0-1 to 0-3 based
on the following criteria: (1) if based on "close"
observation by the reporting senior; and (2) if the officer
was simultaneously rated with other officers in his/her
command (either a "periodic" or "detachment of reporting
senior" occasion) . Neumann selected three possible rating
elements within the fitness reports that would encompass the
officer's overall performance on each FITREP:
1. Command Desirability : the reporting senior's rating of
the desirability of an officer being under his/her
command in a command assignment;
2. Mission Contribution : the evaluation of the officer's
contribution to the unit's mission; and
3. Recommendation for Promotion : the reporting senior's
recommendation of the individual for either early,
regular, or no promotion. [Ref. 10]
The distributions of the three rating elements illustrated
the difficulties associated with "grade inflation. " The
elements were highly skewed to the upper end of the evaluation
scale; consequently, a summary score was used, which computed
the proportion of occasions on which the officer received the
highest possible rating on all qualified fitness reports for
each element was used. An element summary score of 1.0
indicated that the officer received the highest rating on all
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FITREPs in the particular element, while a score of 0.0
indicated never receiving a top rating. Further evaluation
revealed that "recommended for early promotion" (REP) was the
only element with sufficient variability to be used as a
performance index. Only 26 percent received "recommended for
early promotion" over their entire fitness report file, while
over 58 and 61 percent of the individuals received top ratings
over their entire FITREP file in Command Desirability and
Mission Contribution, respectively. [Ref. 10]
Neumann further discovered significant differences in the
mean value of the performance index between pay grades,
warfare specialties, and year groups, preventing the use of a
pooled sample with raw performance index scores. Since the
greatest difference was between grades, three separate
performance index scores were computed for each pay grade
(ENS, LTJG, and LT) . The three scores were then weighted
according to the number of FITREPs for each rank and summed to
generate one performance index score reflecting an officer's
complete fitness report history. [Ref. 10]
The results of Neumann's analysis, obtained by utilizing
ordinary least squares multivariate statistical techniques,
are somewhat surprising. Out of all the factors used in
admission criteria for the Naval Academy, only two non-
academic predictors had a significant positive association
with REP. High school recommendations and extracurricular
activities proved to be the best predictors of officer
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performance potential, while academic criteria (i.e., SAT
score, and high school class rank) seemed to be unrelated.
However, it should be noted that those admitted to the Academy-
are selected based upon superior academic performance. [Ref
.
10]
A second officer performance index was developed by
William R. Bowman of the U.S. Naval Academy in his article,
"Do Engineers Make Better Naval Officers?" Bowman attempted
to test the hypothesis that the best naval officers are those
with a solid technical college background (e.g., those who
major in engineering or math and science) . This was labeled
the "Rickover hypothesis." In contrast to Neumann's
performance index, Bowman uses only one fitness report to
measure performance, the last report received as a Division
Officer (i.e., near the end of the fourth year of active
duty) . This FITREP was thought to provide the best indication
of potential future performance. [Ref. 11]
The objective was to model the statistical relationship
between an individual's academic major and performance at the
Naval Academy and his performance later as a junior officer in
the fleet . Bowman analyzed male Naval Academy graduates from
1976 through 1980, but restricted the sample to those who
entered the surface and submarine warfare communities on the
premise that these two communities are the most technically
oriented and would benefit most from technical degrees. The
data set was constructed by merging academic information
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contained in the Academy's registration files, fleet
experience information contained in the 1986 Navy Officer
Master/Loss file from the Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, and a longitudinal profile of officer fitness
reports from the Navy Personnel Research Development Center,
San Diego. [Ref . 11]
Bowman utilized two measures of junior officer performance
as dependent variables in his multivariate regression models
to determine which graduates (technical, or non- technical)
are: (a) more likely to achieve "superior performance"; and
(b) more likely to remain in service at least six months
beyond initial period of obligation. [Ref. 11]
In the development of his FITREP-based performance index,
Bowman selected a single FITREP that indicated "frequent"
contact with the reporting senior officer, that evaluated the
officer in relation to his peers (i.e., periodic/annual, or on
the occasion of detachment of a reporting senior officer) , and
was the last report as a Division Officer. A "superior
performer" was defined as one who was recommended for early
promotion, and ranked in the top 1 percent category both for
"command desirability" and in the "overall summary" evaluation
on the selected FITREP. As was the case in Neumann's study,
Bowman found that "more discriminating criteria for officer
superiority are not available for junior naval officers."
[Ref. 11]
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Prior to estimating the performance model, Bowman
recognized potential selection bias due to two types of
selection behavior that may indirectly affect officer
performance and retention, since they occur prior to entry
into the fleet. The first is the screening process into the
nuclear surface/submarine communities. Training for the
nuclear power community is highly technical so that those
majoring in technical areas or others who perform above
average in technical courses are more likely to be selected
into the program. The second is the self -selection process
whereby the officer chooses one warfare community over
another.
Self -selection bias may exist if unobservable factors,
such as desire, motivation, or attitude, affect the selection
of one community over another and if the unobservable factors,
in turn, have an impact on fleet performance and retention.
Given that nearly 90 percent of all graduates in nuclear power
communities have technical majors and grade point averages
(GPA) above 2.5 (compared to only about 50 percent in
conventional surface) , failure to account for unobserved
factors that may help to explain this difference could bias
the evaluation of the relationship between academic major and
fleet performance and retention. [Ref. 11]
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Bowman attempted to test/control for self -selectivity bias
through the use of the Heckman procedure, 7 which accounts for
unobserved factors retained from the selection equation
through a new independent variable which is placed in the main
performance equation. This variable, commonly called the
inverse Mills ratio (or LAMBDA) , was found to be statistically
insignificant, meaning that selectivity bias was not detected.
Although the warfare community selection model provided
significant evidence that technical majors with higher GPA'
s
are more likely to choose and be selected for nuclear
programs, Bowman attributed LAMBDA'S insignificance to the
lack of correlation between the error structures of the two
equations. [Ref. 11]
Bowman's main performance model analyzed a binary
dependent variable for "superior" performance, which was set=l
for a superior performer and set=0 otherwise. The model was
estimated using a nonlinear logit technique. The first
category of explanatory variables included binary variables
for ship type, warfare qualifications, fitness report
parameters, and other variables for personal demographics.
The second category of explanatory variables were the focus of
the study -- dummy variables for academic major, and a
continuous variable for grade point average. Some notable
results include the following. Serving on aircraft carriers,
See Heckman [Ref. 12] for further discussion on the
technique used to control for potential selection bias.
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relative to destroyers and ballistic missile submarines,
increased the probability of achieving superior junior officer
performance by 33.6 and 69.7 percent in the conventional and
nuclear navies, respectively. Achieving a warfare
qualification increased superior performance by 14.2 percent
in the nuclear Navy, and 35.1 percent in the conventional.
Racial minorities were from 19.2 percent to 25.6 percent less
likely than whites to achieve superior performance. [Ref . 11]
Bowman's retention model also analyzed a binary dependent
variable that indicated whether or not an officer stayed at
least six months beyond initial obligation. Some notable
results include the following. Nuclear officers serving on
cruisers and attack submarines (relative to nuclear ballistic
submarines) were 21.1 percent and 13.9 percent more likely to
stay, respectively. Occupation relative to an engineering-
maintenance billet seemed to have the largest effect on the
nuclear Navy, where officers filling an administrative billet
were 42.6 percent more likely to stay. Other factors having
significant positive impacts on retention included attaining
a warfare qualification and being black in the conventional
Navy. Being married (with or without children) had a
significant negative impact on retention in both conventional
and nuclear navies. [Ref. 11]
Bowman's analysis of the academic factors found few
significant relationships to junior officer performance and
retention. Bowman contends that the Rickover hypothesis
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cannot be supported because: (a) technical major is
statistically insignificant in the superior performance model,
and (b) management /economics majors are 24.1 percent more
likely to attain a superior performance rating relative to
engineering majors in the conventional surface Navy. This
could mean that junior officer performance is more dependent
on managerial skills than technical knowledge, a far cry from
Rickover's belief. [Ref. 11]
D. SELECTIVITY BIAS
An article written by Burt S. Barnow, Glen G. Cain, and
Arthur S. Goldberger, entitled "Issues in the Analysis of
Selectivity Bias," indicates that selectivity bias is a
potential problem whenever there exists unmeasured
(unobservable) factors related to an explanatory variable that
helps explain both the selection behavior into a "treatment"
(or control) group and the program outcome under study. The
term "bias" refers to the potential that the estimated impact
of the explanatory variable defining the treatment (control)
group on the outcome of the main dependent variable is not
equal to the "true" impact. If assignment to the treatment
group is random, then selectivity bias is not an issue, since
there are no factors (observed or unobserved) that
differentiate selection behavior. However, selectivity bias
continues to affect most econometric models since assignment
of observations to treatment and comparison groups is seldom
39
explicitly random especially in non- experimental data. [Ref
.
13]
The selectivity issue relevant to this thesis deals with
selection into the Navy's fully- funded graduate education
program. Navy graduate education policy makers base selection
for FFGE on academic capability, outstanding professional
performance, promotion potential and a strong educational
background. [Ref. 3] This suggests that selection is indeed
not random and one must be able to predict selection to the
Navy's graduate education program to adjust for the potential
bias created by the Navy's selection process (and self-
selection by individuals) . There are certain observed factors
that explain this selection process, but there are also
significant unobserved factors that may affect both assignment
to the treatment group and the outcome measure. For instance,
outstanding (pre -graduate education) professional performance
and promotion potential may be explained by unmeasurable
factors such as an individual's self-drive, motivation, and
desire for achievement. There are established econometric
procedures designed to capture estimates of unobserved
factors, but the success of such procedures is dependent upon
correct specification of the selection model.
One common way to attack selectivity bias is to simply
include a number of "proxy" variables in the outcome equation
thought to account for the (observed) selection behavior or
process. This is the approach used by Cymrot in the study
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cited above [Ref . 2] . This approach assumes that there are no
other variables, beyond those included as proxies, that are
related to the outcome. Obviously, there are flaws associated
with this approach. Specifically, if explanatory variables
related to selection, but not to the outcome are omitted, the
bias problem still exists. [Ref. 13]
A second approach is a two- stage procedure based on work
done by James J. Heckman [Ref. 12] , commonly called the
Heckman procedure. This technique is outlined in a study
completed for the Department of Labor [Ref. 14] . In the first
stage, selection into the treatment and comparison groups is
modeled through a nonlinear probit analysis using at least one
determinant that has no effect on the main outcome equation.
The reason for using a different variable in the selection
equation is to ensure "identification" of the model. 8 In
addition to estimates of the coefficients in the selection
model, the probit provides an estimate of a correction factor,
LAMBDA (X) , which encompasses values for unobserved factors
obtained from the error structure of the selection model based
on the probability of the likelihood of acquiring the
treatment for each observation. In the second stage, the
estimated LAMBDA is included as a regressor in the main
outcome equation along with the treatment variable and other
8 Identification is a precondition where at least one of the
predetermined variables, from the selection equation, is omitted
from the main equation to differentiate between the specifications
of the two equations. [Ref. 16]
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factors related to the outcome. The typical procedure
specifies that the outcome equation be estimated in a linear
fashion using ordinary least squares in order to maintain
consistent estimates; however, this thesis uses nonlinear
logit models for two of the three outcome equations due to the
binary nature of the dependent variables. 9 The Heckman two-




The selection probit is defined as:
Pr(z=l)=Pr(w>-v'y) = ^ (y/Y)
a
where: z is the (0,1) comparison/treatment group
indicator,
w is a normal random variable,
v'y are the estimates of a vector of observed
characteristics that influence selection,
a is the standard deviation of z,
$ is the unit -normal cumulative distribution
function.
A correction factor, X, is then formed for each
observation:
for a treatment group member,
i. 4>(H)
.
($ (H) ) '
9 Although two- stage selection procedures generally specify
a linear ordinary least squares model to be used in the second
stage, William H. Greene in his LIMDEP Version 6.0 User's Manual
and Reference Guide, makes reference to a two-step procedure that
supports the use of nonlinear regression techniques in both steps.
[Ref. 15, p. 637]
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and for comparison group members,
A = -<f>(H)(1-$(H))'




The estimated value of the correction factor, X', is
included as a regressor in the outcome equation:
where: y^ = outcome measure for individual i;
x' 2 = vector of explanatory variables;
z_£ = indicator of selection status;
X'_£ = estimated values of the correction
factor; and
fi^ = individual random error term.
By modeling selection with this two- stage process, the
objective is to specify a multiple regression that "holds
constant" those characteristics not already in the model that
affect the outcome and are correlated with selection into the
treatment group. [Ref . 14]
There are potential weaknesses associated with the Heckman
procedure that may limit its effectiveness. The probit
analysis of the selection model may not yield accurate
predictions if it is not correctly specified. If the
selection process is not explained well, the first stage
produces an unreliable estimate of the correction factor
(LAMBDA)
. Hence, including LAMBDA in the second stage may
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lead to ambiguous estimates of the effect of the treatment.
If the treatment estimate seems unreasonably large, for
example, one should check for excessive correlation
(multicollinearity) between LAMBDA and other variables in the
second stage. Another limitation that may pose difficulties
with this procedure is the existence of other types or levels
of selection that precede the one in question. Such a
sequential selection process would require the use of an
ordered probit analysis, or multiple selection rules.
Essentially, the Heckman procedure depends heavily on its
ability to predict treatment/comparison group status. [Ref.
14]
Finally, another concern with selectivity bias arises when
being in a treatment group determines the outcome. For
example, the fact that an officer has attained fully- funded
graduate education may cause promotion to the next higher
rank. This causality is referred to as endogeneity, which
violates the econometric assumption that the error term and
each explanatory variable are independent of each other.
[Ref. 16] A procedure developed by Burt S. Barnow et al.
corrects for this biased endogenous relationship using a two-
stage process very similar to Heckman' s. Barnow' s first stage
is identical to that of Heckman' s, in which a probit analysis
predicts selection into the endogenous treatment group and
probabilities of selection associated with each observation.
The second stage, instead of using LAMBDA, uses the predicted
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probabilities as an "instrument variable" in place of the
treatment explanatory variable in the outcome equation. The
use of this new instrument variable removes the endogeneity as
well as the correlation with the error term. [Ref. 13]
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter discusses the officer data base and how it
was used to develop explanatory variables related to the three
measures of performance introduced in Chapter I. A discussion
of the statistical methodologies used in obtaining the
empirical results concludes the chapter.
A. DATA
Two data sets were used in this analysis. The first was
obtained from Dr. William R. Bowman of the U.S. Naval Academy.
Using information from the Navy Officer Master File,
maintained at the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
,
Monterey, CA, he created an updated version of the Navy
Officer Promotion History Data File. Bowman's data provided
the means to create two separate files containing background,
Navy experience, and promotion selection board results for all
officers going before the Lieutenant (LT/0-3) selection board
between fiscal years 1981 and 1985 and the Lieutenant
Commander (LCDR/0-4) selection board between fiscal years 1985
and 1990. Merging these two files determined which officers
remained in the Navy at least until the LCDR selection board.
Since the focus of this thesis is on Surface Warfare
officers, the officer community designator was used to
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restrict the sample to the Surface Warfare community. Only
the SWO's who remained in the service through the LCDR
promotion board and who stayed in the community were retained
in the final sample. Officers transferring into the SWO
community were included since it is generally done early in
one's career. A total of 1,860 SWOs were extracted from
Bowman's data files. However, 282 observations were lost due
to missing values when creating variables, leaving 1,577
observations for the final sample.
The second data set used is a longitudinal profile of
officer fitness reports, obtained from the Navy Personnel
Research and Development Center (NPRDC) , San Diego, CA.
Matching social security numbers from Bowman's data set to the
FITREP files provided a complete history of FITREPs for each
officer reaching the LCDR promotion point. Although this
study is restricted to Surface Warfare officers, FITREP file
histories were obtained for all officers to facilitate future
research efforts on other URL communities.
The FITREPs selected for inclusion in the analysis were
restricted to those that indicated "periodic" or "detachment
of reporting senior" in the block for occasion, "regular" in
the block for type of report, and "close" in the block for
basis of the reporting senior's observation of the officer.
These restrictions ensured that officers in the sample were
evaluated against all their peers in the command, and that
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they worked closely with the Commanding Officer, which reveals
a more accurate picture of the officer's true performance.
Not observed (NOB) reports, submitted for short periods of
duty or during schooling, fail to provide any meaningful
performance information. Consequently, they were omitted from
the sample. The data element "early," containing the
recommendation for promotion, was used as the indicator of an
observed report since it is left blank on all NOB reports.
The final restriction on FITREPs was on the period of the
report. Since Bowman's data was limited through fiscal year
1990, FITREPs submitted covering a period extending beyond
1990 were omitted.
Fitness report files for each officer were subdivided into
two categories according to rank, labelled as "early" and
"late." Early FITREPs included those obtained as an Ensign
(0-1) or Lieutenant Junior Grade (0-2) , and late included
those obtained as a Lieutenant (0-3) . The reason for this
division is twofold. First, since early FITREPs evaluate the
majority of the officer's initial obligation, it is of
interest to determine the effect of early performance on post-
initial obligation performance. Second, given that most
officers obtain graduate education during their first shore
tour, normally at 5 to 6 years of service, most of the late
(LT) FITREPs are received after the attainment of graduate
education. This allows one to determine performance
differences before and' after graduate education.
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The subsample of SWO's (N=l,577), created from Bowman's
promotion history data files, and the sample of FITREP files
were merged by assigned ID numbers, keeping only those
officers containing information in both files. This merge
found 100 officers with incomplete FITREP files, thus yielding
a final working sample of 1,477 SWO officers.
Figure 3 displays the seven categories of explanatory
variables used in the statistical models of selection,
promotion, percent of LT FITREPS recommended for early
promotion, and last LT FITREP RAP. Although not all the
variables are used in every model, it is important to
understand the process by which each was created. Table I,
presented at the end of this section, specifically defines the
coding for each explanatory variable.
The FITREP performance variables were created based on a
performance index developed by Idell Nuemann at NPRDC.
Separate summary scores were calculated for FITREPs defined as
early (EPCTREP) and late (LPCTREP) by obtaining the proportion
of all early and late FITREPS recommended for early promotion,
yielding two continuous variables. As with Neumann's study,
distributions of FITREP rating elements established
"recommendation for early promotion" as the single most
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ETIREE PERFORMANCE
BPCTREP - PERCENT OF EARLY RAPS
LPCTREP - PERCENT OP LATE RAPS
COMMISSIONING SOURCE
fflSLROTC - ATTEMDBD HIGH SELCBCT
ROTC COLLEGE
ESBLOCS - ATTENDED HIQH SELECT
COLLEGE THEN OCS
LOSLROTC - ATTENDED LOW SELECT
ROTC COLLEGE
LOSELOCS ATTENDED LOW SELECT
COLLEGE THEN OCS
USNA - ATTENDED NAVAL
ACADBMY
NESEP - ENLISTED COMMISSION
PROGRAM
PERSONAL DEMOGRAPHICS
SEX - MALE OR FEMALE
MINORITY - NDN-CAUCASION
AGENOW - CURRENT AGE
MARONLY - MARRIED NO CHILDREN
MARCHDLD - MARRIED WITH
CHILDREN
DIVCHILD - DIVORCED WITH CHILDREN
SINGLE - NOT MARRIED
^JAW FYPFPTFNPF
NUC - NUCLEAR POWER OFFICER
NOCOMBAT - NEVER SERVED ON A
CRUDES SHIP
NODEPHD - NOT YET ATTENDED
DEPARTMENT HEAD SCH
EOOWQUAL - ENGINEERING OFFICER OF
THE WATCH QUALED
TAOQUAL - TACTICAL ACTION OFFICER.
QUALED
EARSWO - ACHIEVED SURFACE WARFARE
QUAL BEFORE LT BOARD
EAREOOW - ACHIEVED ENGINEERING
OFFICER QUAL BEFORE LT
EARTAO - ACHIEVED TACTICAL ACTION
OFFICER QUAL BEFORE LT
ACADEMIC PROFILE
GPA - UNDERGRAD GRADB POINT AVG
MATHSKIL - UNDERGRAD MATH EXP
TBCHSKIL - UNDERGRAD SCIENCE EXP
ELIGCURR - NUMBER OF CURRICULA
ELIGIBLE AT NPS
FISCAL YEAR OF CM SEL BD
FYSBS5 • FYSB90
TREATMENT VARIABLE
FFGB - ATTAINED FULLY-FUNDED
GRADUATE EDUCATION
Figure 3 . A list of explanatory variables grouped
by category.
discriminating factor in the rating of officers. 10
Commissioning Source and undergraduate college academic
rank, obtained from Barron's Profiles of American Colleges ,
were combined to determine if performance differences could be
attributed to the undergraduate school's quality. Highly
10 The data revealed that only 49 percent of all SWO FITREPs
were "recommended for early promotion", while 70 and 67 percent of
all SWO FITREPs received the highest possible grades in "command
desirability" and "mission contribution", respectively. Remaining
FITREP elements revealed even greater skewness toward the upper end
of the grading scale.
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selective undergraduate colleges were defined as those with
"most," "highly," and "very competitive" rankings in Barron's
Profiles. Schools with lower rankings in Barron's were
defined as having low competitiveness. As displayed in Table
I, undergraduate college quality criteria were applied only to
officers from Reserve Officer Training Contract/Scholarship
(HISLROTC, LOSLROTC) and Officer Candidate School (HISELOCS,
LOSELOCS) , since the majority of the officers in the sample
are commissioned through the highly competitive Naval Academy
(USNA) . The six possible commissioning source variables are
binary in nature, and measured on the positive condition
(commission source=l, else=0)
.
The personal demographic variables include seven
individual characteristics that may effect performance. The
sex of the officer is coded as a binary variable, with
(FEMALE=1, else=0) . Minority is also a binary variable
(MINORITY)
,
defined with race/ethnic codes indicating black or
other than white (black/other=l, else=0) . The current age of
the officer is used as a continuous variable (AGENOW)
,
indicating the exact age of the officer at the time of his or
her 0-4 selection board. Four additional binary variables are
used to combine marital status and dependent information,
indicating married with children (MARCHILD) , married without
children (MARONLY) , divorced with children (DIVCHILD) , or
single with no dependents (SINGLE)
.
51
Variables indicating specific Navy experience were
selected based on certain qualifications and credentials
considered vital early in a Surface Warfare officer's career.
All eight experience variables are binary, indicating whether
or not the officer possesses a particular qualification or
credential
.
Nuclear power designated officers were identified through
the Additional Qualification Designator (AQD) data element.
Since nuclear officers are required to obtain their
engineering qualification first, well before consideration for
the 0-4 promotion board, any officer with an AQD in nuclear
power engineering were designated as a "NUC."
Combatants (CRUDES ships) , including cruisers, destroyers,
frigates, and battleships, 11 are considered the "backbone"
of the surface fleet. Serving on one of these ship types is
considered career- enhancing for SWOs due to the emphasis
placed on weapon systems and the fact that all the Commanding
Officers are designated Surface Warfare Officers. A data
element revealing duty stations was used to count the number
of CRUDES ships an officer had served on. The created
variable (N0C0MBAT) indicated that an officer had never served
on a CRUDES ship.
11 Currently, there are no battleships in active service.
During the period this data was gathered (Fiscal Years 1981-1990)
,
all four Iowa class battleships were in commissioned service.
52
Attending SWO Department Head School as early as possible
after completion of the first sea tour is essential in the SWO
career path. Surface program managers contend that completing
Department Head School by the seventh year of service is vital
within the designed SWO time- line to meet designated career
goals. Since promotion to 0-4 generally occurs in the eighth
to ninth year of service, completion of Department Head School
before the selection board is crucial . A data element
indicating service schools attended was used to identify
whether or not an officer had completed the Department Head
course. The created variable (NODEPHD) signifies that an
officer has not yet attended Department Head School
.
There are three essential qualifications that a SWO must
obtain: (1) qualification as a Surface Warfare Officer
(SWOQUAL) ; (2) Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOWQUAL)
;
and (3) Tactical Action Officer (TAOQUAL) . Using the AQD data
element, two sets of variables identifying qualifications in
these three areas were created: (1) whether or not the
officer had attained EOOW or TAO prior to the 0-4 board; and,
(2) whether or not the officer had achieved an early SWO,
EOOW, or TAO qualification prior to the 0-3 board. SWO
qualification after the 0-3 board was not included in the
analysis, since it is required during the first sea tour and
nearly all the officers in the sample had acquired it by then.
Criteria for graduate education selection is contained in
the academic profile variables. Three continuous variables
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from Bowman's data are used to indicate undergraduate
education experience and performance:
1. Undergraduate Grade Point Average (GPA) is assigned
values ranging from to 5, being the lowest and 5 the
highest;
2. Math Qualification Code (MQC) is assigned values ranging




Technical Qualification Code (TQC) is assigned values
ranging from to 5 in ascending order of physics
difficulty and performance.
An additional continuous variable utilizes these three
academic profile codes to determine the number of Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) curricula one is eligible for
(ELIGCURR) . Criteria for this measure was obtained from the
Naval Postgraduate School Catalogue of courses for 1993.
[Ref . 1] Surface Warfare officers are eligible for 29 out of
a total of 38 available curricula and the values for this
variable range from to 29.
Department of the Navy officer manning requirements change
from year to year. Consequently, a variable indicating the
fiscal year of each officer's selection board (FYSB85-FYSB90)
was used to control for potential differences in promotion
opportunity across different year groups.
Officers with fully- funded graduate educations comprise
the "control (or treatment) group" since they are the focus of
this study and are compared to the remaining officers in the
sample without this "treatment." The data element used to
create this treatment variable (FFGE) included four
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conditions: (1) NPS graduate degree, (2) fully- funded
civilian school graduate degree, (3) non- funded graduate
degree, or (4) no graduate degree. Combining the first two
possibilities defined the group of officers with fully- funded
graduate education. 12
Table I provides a complete description of the definitions
of the explanatory variables used in the analysis below. The
next section of this chapter describes the dependent measures
and the specifications of the models to be estimated.
12 The data discriminates only between fully- funded and non-
funded graduate educated officers, and since non- funded graduate
educations are obtained at no cost to the Navy, it was decided to
restrict the treatment group to fully- funded graduate educated
officers.
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TABLE I. DESCRIPTION OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES.
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
FITREP PERFORMANCE
EPCTREP = percent of all ENS and LTJG FITREPS
"recommended for early promotion"
LPCTREP = percent of all LT FITREPS "recommended for
early promotion"
COMMISSIONING SOURCE
HISLROTC = 1 if commissioned through ROTC at a "most",
"highly" , or "very" competitive undergraduate
school
= otherwise
HISELOCS = 1 if commissioned through OCS and attended a
"most", "highly" , or "very" competitive
undergraduate school
= otherwise
LOSLROTC = 1 if commissioned through ROTC at an
undergraduate school not ranked above
competitive
= otherwise
LOSELOCS = 1 if commissioned through OCS and attended an
undergraduate school not ranked above
competitive
= otherwise
USNA = 1 if commissioned at the U.S. Naval Academy
= otherwise
NESEP = 1 if commissioned by the Naval Enlisted
Service Education Program through OCS
= otherwise
PERSONAL DEMOGRAPHICS
SEX = 1 if female
MINORITY = 1 if black or other than white
AGENOW = age at time of 0-4 selection board
MARONLY - 1 if married and no children
MARCHILD = 1 if married with children
DIVCHILD = 1 if divorced/separated with child
SINGLE = 1 if never been married or divorced and no
children
NAVY EXPERIENCE
NUC = 1 if designated Nuclear Power
NOCOMBAT = 1 if never served on a combatant/CRUDES ship
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VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
NODEPHD = l if not yet attended Department Head School
EOOWQUAL = 1 if Engineering Officer of the Watch
qualified
TAOQUAL = 1 if qualified as Tactical Action Officer
EARSWO = 1 if achieved early Surface Warfare Officer
qualification, before the 0-3 promotion board
EAREOOW = 1 if achieved early Engineering Officer of
the Watch qualification, before the 0-3
promotion board
EARTAO = 1 if achieved early qualification as Tactical
Action Officer
ACADEMIC PROFILE
GPA undergraduate grade point average where; 0=0-
1.89, 1=1.9-2.19, 2=2.2-2.59, 3=2.6-3.19,
4=3.2-3.59, 5=3.6-4.0
MATHSKILL where 0=no math, l=pre-calc, 2=two pre-calc
with B avg, 3=calc with C avg, 4= two calc with
C+ avg, 5=two calc with B+ avg, 6=sig post-calc
with B+ avg
TECHSKILL where 0=no physics, l=physics with C avg,
2=physics sequence with C+ avg, 3=phys seq with
B+ avg, 4=eng/phys major with C+ avg,
5=eng/phys maj with B+ avg
ELIGCURR = number of NPS curricula eligible, ranging
from to 29
FY OF 0-4 SEL BOARD
FYSB85 = 1 if 0-4 selection board was in fiscal year
1985
FYSB86 = 1 if 0-4 selection board was in fiscal year
1986
FYSB87 = 1 if 0-4 selection board was in fiscal year
1987
FYSB88 = 1 if 0-4 selection board was in fiscal year
1988
FYSB89 = 1 if 0-4 selection board was in fiscal year
1989
FYSB90 = 1 if 0-4 selection board was in fiscal year
1990
TREATMENT VARIABLE
FFGE = 1 if has fully- funded graduate education




The purpose of this thesis is to determine the impact of
fully- funded graduate education on three measures of
performance: (1) promotion to 0-4 (yes-no) , (2) percent RAP
of LT FITREPs, and (3) RAP of last LT FITREP prior to the 0-4
board (yes -no) . Because selection for FFGE is based on
established criteria, it is not the result of a random
process. As discussed in the literature review in Chapter II,
non- random selection into any treatment introduces the
potential for bias when attempting to estimate the effects of
being in the treatment group. Thus, it is imperative to be
able to predict FFGE selection with sufficient accuracy to
obtain reliable correction factors to control for selection
bias in the performance models.
Selection for fully- funded graduate education and the
three measures of performance are the dependent variables of
the four main statistical models specified and estimated in
this study. Table II provides a complete description of the
definitions of the dependent variables used in the models.
For each performance measure, four different model
specifications are estimated. These are designed to
demonstrate the marginal effect of FFGE on performance where
different controls are introduced. The first specification
measures the marginal effect of fully- funded graduate
education with no controls; the second specification measures
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this effect with observed control factors included in the
equation. The third and fourth specifications apply two
alternative techniques to correct for the presence of
selectivity bias.
TABLE II. DESCRIPTION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES.
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
SELECTION MODEL
FFGE = 1 if has fully- funded graduate education




PROMOTE = 1 if promoted to 0-4 early or "in zone"
= otherwise
LPCTREP = percent of all LT FITREPs receiving
"recommended for early promotion"
LASTLTRP = 1 if last LT FITREP prior to 0-4
selection board received "recommended for
early promotion"
= otherwise
Figure 4 illustrates the methodology used for the
selection model and for the four model specifications for each
of the three performance models. Each model and specification
will be discussed in the order presented in Figure 4.
1. Selection Model
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) states that
"selection for Navy funded graduate education will be based on
academic capability, outstanding professional performance,
promotion potential and a strong educational background.
"
[Ref
. 3, p. 2] This reflects the criteria applied by the Navy
in selecting candidates for graduate studies. In addition,
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SETiECTION MODEL x
FFGE = f (Y)
PERFORMANCE MODELS
1. TOTAL EFFECT 2
PERFi = t(FFGE)
2. EFFECT WITH OBSERVED FACTORS 3
PERFi = f (FFGE, X)
3. HECKMAN APPROACH




= t(FFGE, X, LAMBDA)
4. BARNOW APPROACH 4




1 Y represents a vector of explanatory variables.
2 The i performance measures are: PROMOTE, LPCTREP, and
LASTLTRP.
3 X represents a vector of explanatory variables.
4 PHAT is the probability of FFGE selection for each
officer.
Figure 4 . Methodology used in obtaining estimates
for the Selection Model and the three Performance
Measure Models.
the decision to apply for and undertake graduate studies is a
personal decision, which therefore involves a degree of self-
selection. The specification of the fully- funded graduate
education selection model attempts to capture both sources of
selection:
FFGE = f (GPA, MATHSKILL, TECHSKILL, EPCTREP, ELIGCURR,
EARSWO, EAREOOW, EARTAO)
where all variables were defined in Table I.
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"Academic capability" and "a strong educational
background" were captured by four explanatory variables. The
variables, GPA, MATHSKILL, and TECHSKILL are combined to
determine one's Academic Profile Code (APC) , a three-digit
number indicating academic exposure and performance,
specifically in math and science. The APC is the sole factor
in determining academic qualifications. [Ref. 17] An
additional variable, ELIGCURR, delineates the strength of an
officer's APC by indicating how many NPS curricula one is
eligible for.
Selection for fully- funded graduate education occurs
at the 0-3 promotion board. Consequently, criteria for
"outstanding professional performance" and "promotion
potential" are captured by variables indicating early FITREP
performance and whether or not an officer achieved early
qualifications in SWO, EOOW, or TAO. Inclusion of the early
qualification variables also seemed to be plausible proxies
(substitutes) for unobserved factors, such as, motivation,
desire for achievement, hard working, and confidence, so often
associated with those possessing a graduate degree. As
discussed earlier, failing to account for these factors could
bias the estimated effect of FFGE on performance.
Since FFGE is a binary variable, it is modeled using
a nonlinear maximum- likelihood probit procedure, which
constrains the predicted values to the measured unit interval
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of to l. 13 The FFGE selection probit estimates the impact
of each explanatory variable on the likelihood of selection
for FFGE and computes predicted probabilities of selection for
each officer. The goal would be to have the model correctly
predict a high proportion of observations, since this model
will play an integral role in determining the presence of
selectivity bias.
2 . Promotion Model
The first dependent performance measure is a binary
variable (PR0M0TE=1, else=0) , indicating whether an officer
promoted to 0-4 early or "in zone" (i.e., selected before or
during their first year of eligibility) . Officers selected
late were not considered promotions in this study, since they
had failed to promote once already. Each of the four
13 The probit uses the normal Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) in estimating the model. Assume we let Y=l if the
officer attained FFGE, and Y=0 if the officer did not. There is an
unobservable critical threshold level index, call it 1$* , such that
if I i exceeds Ij* the officer will attain FFGE, otherwise he/she
will not. Given the assumption of normality, the probability (P^
that Ii* is less than or equal to Ii is computed from the
standardized normal CDF as:
t 2 t 2
Pi =Pr{Y=±)=Pr{lUli )=F{Ii)=-^l Iie~~T dt=-±-(* 1+ * iXie~~dt
where: t is a standard normal variable and
X represents a vector of explanatory variables.
Here, the probability of attaining FFGE is measured by the area
of the standard normal curve from -oo to Ii. [Ref.20:p. 492]
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promotion specifications obtain parameter estimates by
applying maximum likelihood techniques to a logit model. 14
a. Total Effect of FFGE i
This model treats FFGE as if it was the only
determinant of promotion to 0-4. This is a "naive" model in
the sense that it omits all other factors that might affect
promotion, and thus illustrates the total impact of FFGE on
the likelihood of promotion. However, it is clear that
attainment of fully- funded graduate education is not the only
contributing factor to promotion. There are other factors
that affect promotion and that have an indirect impact on
whether or not an officer has FFGE. This model merely
establishes that there is a relationship between promotion and
FFGE.
14 The logit uses the logistic Cumulative Distribution
Function to estimate a model. If Y=l means that an officer was
promoted to 0-4 and X± represents a vector of explanatory
variables, then the probability that an officer will promote to 0-4
(P^) can be represented by:
Pi =E(Y=l\Xi )= L_.
l+e'Zi
where: Z± = $ 1 + 0^.
This formulation allows Z^ to range from -oo to +oo, while V± is
restricted between and 1 and is nonlinearly related to Zi .
Although the probit and logit formulations provide quite similar
results, the chief difference is that the probit normal curve
approaches its limits (0,1) quicker than the logit curve. The
choice between the two is one of mathematical convenience and
availability of computer programs. In general, the logit model is
normally preferred to the probit. [Ref. 20:pp. 481-496]
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b. Effect of FFGE With Observed Factors
The purpose of this model is to illustrate the
change in the impact of fully- funded -.graduate education on
promotion when other determinants of promotion are included.
The other determinants are described as "observed" because
they comprise information readily available to promotion
selection boards. The specification of this model is as
follows
:
PROMOTE = f (FFGE, EPCTREP, LPCTREP, GPA, HISLROTC, HISELOCS,
LOSLROTC, LOSELOCS, NESEP, FEMALE, MINORITY,
AGEN0W, MARONLY, MARCHILD, DIVCHILD, NUC,
NOCOMBAT, NODEPHD, EARSWO, E00WQUAL, TA0QUAL,
FYSB85, FYSB86, FYSB87, FYSB88, FYSB89)
.
Because each of the determinants are correlated,
meaning they impact one another indirectly, the estimate of
FFGE in this specification represents the direct impact on
promotion.
The FITREP performance variables are used to
control for an officer's evaluated performance prior to the 0-
4 promotion board, and as expected, plays a major role in
determining the probability of promotion. Other factors
included in this specification that may effect the likelihood
of promotion are commissioning source by undergraduate college
selectivity, various demographic characteristics, the degree
of Navy experience, and the fiscal year of one's selection
board. When creating dummy variables, it is necessary to omit
one of the conditions from the regression so comparisons can
be made. Therefore, USNA is the omitted condition within
64
commissioning source, SINGLE is omitted from marital status,
and FYSB90 from fiscal year of 0-4 promotion board. It is
expected that the estimate of FFGE will be considerably less
significant than the total effect after accounting for these
factors.
Although the results of this model will provide a
respectable estimate for FFGE on promotion, the issue of
exactly what makes an individual with fully- funded graduate
education more promotable/productive is a bit more ambiguous.
It may be that the virtual knowledge and responsibility gained
through graduate education causes an increase in productivity
or, those selected for graduate education may already be more
productive due to innate characteristics that make them more
motivated and hard working. If the latter is true, the
potential for selectivity bias exists and failure to account
for these innate characteristics may cause the coefficient for
FFGE to be overestimated. There are established procedures
designed to introduce these innate characteristics
(unobservables) into the regression equation to obtain an
unbiased estimate of the treatment (FFGE) effect.
c. Heckman Approach
One way to determine and correct for selectivity
bias is based on a two- stage procedure developed by James
Heckman, described in Chapter II. The first -stage employs the
selection probit model to calculate a correction factor, which
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incorporates both the unobserved factors (contained in the
error structure of the model) and the probabilities of
selection for FFGE associated with each officer in a term
called LAMBDA. The second- stage calls for running the same
model used in specification (b.) with the addition of LAMBDA
in the equation. The intent is to purge any correlation
between the treatment effect (FFGE) and the error term by
introducing part of this error structure into the model . The
resulting sign and significance of LAMBDA will determine the
extent of selection bias and isolate the true impact of FFGE
on promotion.
d. Barnow Approach
A second method to account for selectivity bias is
based on another two- stage procedure, developed by Burt
Barnow, also described in Chapter II. This procedure is less
encompassing than Heckman's and focuses on removing any
correlation between the treatment variable (FFGE) and the
dependent measure (PROMOTE) . This condition of causality is
called endogeneity and is a distinct possibility in this
study, since 95 percent of those with FFGE were promoted.
The first -stage employs the selection model probit,
but in this case, only the probabilities of selection into
FFGE associated with each officer are retained in a term
called PHAT. The second- stage uses the same model
specification in (b.) with the exception of substituting PHAT
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for FFGE. Restricting the measure of fully- funded graduate
education on promotion to the probability of attainment
attempts to remove any endogeneity, thus providing a more
accurate measure of the impact of FFGE through PHAT.
3. Percent RAP of LT FITREPs Model
A continuous dependent variable, LPCTREP, is used as
a second measure of performance. This measure was derived
from an identical performance index developed by Idell Neumann
at NPRDC. [Ref. 10] As discussed in the previous data
section, the dependent measure represents the proportion of
all LT FITREPs that received a recommendation for early
promotion. The intent of this measure is to capture post-
graduate education performance and determine if fully- funded
graduate education does in fact enhance the ability to perform
at a higher level. Since the dependent variable is linear,
ordinary least squares (OLS) is used in obtaining parameter
estimates in all specifications.
a. Total Effect of FFGE
This specification, with FFGE as the only
explanatory variable, establishes the total impact of fully-
funded graduate education on the percentage of LT FITREPs
receiving an early recommendation for promotion. A
significant positive estimate of FFGE simply means that there
is a positive relationship between early promotion
recommendations and fully- funded graduate education
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attainment. However, there are other observed factors that
must be considered to further explain early promotion
recommendations. i
Jb. Effect of FFGE With Observed Factors
Since LPCTREP is used as one of the factors to
explain promotion to 0-4 and the same sample population is
used in this model, many of the same explanatory variables
used in the promotion model are used to explain early
promotion recommendations. The specification takes the
following form:
LPCTREP = f (FFGE, EPCTREP, GPA, HISLROTC, HISELOCS, LOSLROTC,
LOSELOCS, NESEP, FEMALE, MINORITY, AGENOW,
MARONLY, MARCHILD, DIVCHILD, NUC, NOCOMBAT,
N0DEPHD, EARSW0, E00WQUAL, TAOQUAL)
.
Since LPCTREP is the dependent measure, it is
removed from the right hand side and since the fiscal year of
selection board has no effect on FITREP performance, FYSB85-
FYSB90 are omitted from this model. As in the promotion
model, determinants are correlated to each other, so this




The same two- stage procedure discussed in the
promotion model is used here with the exception of the




This is identical to the two- stage procedure used
in the promotion model, except for the dependent performance
measure (LPCTREP)
.
4. Last LT FITREP RAP Model
A binary dependent variable, LASTLTRP, is used as the
third and final performance measure. It is based on a FITREP
performance index developed by William Bowman of the U.S.
Naval Academy. [Ref. 11] The dependent measure indicates
whether or not the officer received an early recommendation
for promotion on their last LT FITREP prior to the 0-4
promotion selection board (LASTLTRP=1, else=0) . This last
FITREP is considered critical since it completes a trend of
either declining or improving performance, unless of course
the officer received early recommendations on all FITREPs.
The objective here is similar to the two previous
performance measures - - to determine the extent to which
fully- funded graduate education explains receiving an early
promotion recommendation on the last LT FITREP. Since the
dependent measure is binary, nonlinear logit models are used
to obtain parameter estimates in all four specifications.
Since this measure is also derived from FITREPs, the
specification is identical to that used in the LPCTREP model.
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a. Total Effect of FFGE
With FFGE as the only explanatory variable, this
specification illustrates the total impact of fully- funded
graduate educated officers on whether or not the last LT
FITREP is recommended for early promotion. This specification
establishes the initial relationship between FFGE and
LASTLTRP
.
Jb. Effect of FFGE With Observed Factors
Using the same observed factors as the percent RAP
of LT FITREPs model, this specification determines the direct
impact of FFGE on LASTLTRP when adding other observed factors.
Accounting for these other determinants of LASTLTRP and
because these other observed factors also have an indirect
impact on FFGE, the estimate of FFGE is expected to be
considerably less than was found in the total effect
specification.
c. Heckman Approach
This is identical to the two- stage Heckman
procedure described in the promotion model, with the exception
of the dependent performance measure (LASTLTRP)
.
d. Barnow Approach
This is identical to the two- stage Barnow procedure
described in the promotion model, with the exception of the
dependent performance measure (LASTLTRP)
.
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By now, it should be obvious that the selection model
plays a significant role in determining selection bias.
Essentially, the procedures used to account for selectivity
bias will only be as effective as the ability to accurately
predict fully- funded graduate education selection. However,
a potential problem already exists in that, just because one
is selected for FFGE does not necessarily mean he or she will
choose to pursue it. The data only reflects those selectees
who elected to attain fully- funded graduate education;
officers meeting the minimum academic and performance criteria
electing not to attend FFGE are considered "non-selects."
A final issue deserving of some attention deals with an
additional level of selectivity. The Selectivity Bias section
in Chapter II addresses a potential limitation of the Heckman
procedure if there exists other types of selection, preceding
the one in question, that may effect the outcome of the main
equation. An officer's decision whether to stay or leave the
service at the completion of his/her initial tour of
obligation is a selection issue that, in most cases, precedes
selection for fully- funded graduate education; the factors
explaining this separation behavior may help to explain
promotion and performance. Hence, it would seem that a dual
selection approach, including both separation and fully- funded
graduate education selectivity issues is required. The
specification of the separation model focuses on variables
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that might help to explain an officer's decision to stay or
leave early in one's career:
SEP = f (EPCTREP, GPA, HISLROTC, HISELOCS, LOSLROTC,
LOSELOCS, NESEP, FEMALE, MINORITY, AGENOW,
MARONLY, MARCHILD, DIVCHILD, NUC, N0C0MBAT,
EARSWO, EAREOOW, EARTAO)
.
A nonlinear probit with a binary dependent variable
(SEP=1, else=0) was used to obtain an additional correction
factor to account for potential selectivity bias associated
with separation behavior. A Heckman procedure with correction
factors for both separation and FFGE selection (LAMBDA1,
LAMBDA2) was run for each performance measure to determine the
impact with the additional level of selection. Although this
selectivity issue is important, the results are provided in
the Appendix since the differences between using this multiple






This section analyzes the sample of 1,477 SWO's extracted
from the two original data sources. Since the focus of this
study is on officers with fully- funded graduate education, it
is useful to examine the means of the three dependent
variables (performance measures) and of each explanatory
variable for the full sample, and subsamples of those with and
without FFGE. Table III displays variable means (and standard
deviations) for three groups: (1) those with fully- funded
graduate education; (2) those without fully- funded graduate
education; and (3) the full sample.
Table III indicates significant differences in the
attributes of those with and without FFGE. Analysis of these
differences may help identify which variables are likely to
have an impact on selection for fully- funded graduate
education.
Analysis of the characteristics of the full sample
reveals, for example:
• 81.5 percent promoted to 0-4
• 71 percent of all LT FITREPs received early promotion
recommendations
• 82.9 percent received an early promotion recommendation on
the last LT FITREP
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• 37 percent of all early (ENS/LTJG) FITREPs were
recommended for early promotion
• 3 0.3 percent were USNA graduates, the most frequent
commissioning source
• over 9 percent were male and white
• the average age was 32
• over one -half (52.1 percent) were married with children
• over 90 percent had served on a CRUDES ship
• 74 percent had attended Department Head School
• the majority were not EOOW or TAO qualified, but 57.3
percent had received an early SWO qualification
• the average undergraduate GPA ranged between 2 . 6 and 3 . 19
• an officer was eligible for an average of 10 curricula at
NPS
• were evenly distributed across fiscal year promotion
boards for 0-4
• and nearly one- fifth had completed a fully- funded graduate
education by the time they were in zone to be considered
for 0-4.
The mean values of the performance measures by group
displayed in Figure 1 of Chapter I indicated sizeable
differences in performance in favor of FFGE officers. The
performance measure differences suggest that having FFGE has
the largest effect on whether or not one gets promoted to 0-4,
as 95 percent of the officers with FFGE were promoted compared
to only 78 percent of the officers without FFGE. The means
(in Table III) of the other two FITREP performance measures
(LPCTREP and LASTLTRP) also indicates better performance by
officers with FFGE; the latter outperformed officers without
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FFGE by 10 and 5 percentage points on these two measures,
respectively.
TABLE III. MEANS, PROPORTIONS, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF














PROMOTE .950 (.218) .783 (.412) .815 (.388)
LPCTREP .795 (.260) .696 (.281) .715 (.279)
LASTLTRP .865 (.342) .820 (.384) .829 (.377)
FITREP PERFORMANCE
EPCTREP .509 (.360) .334 (.369) .367 (.374)
LPCTREP .795 (.260) .696 (.281) .715 (.297)
COMMISSIONING SOURCE
HISLROTC .163 (.370) .168 (.374) .167 (.373)
HISELOCS .128 (.334) .158 (.365) .152 (.359)
LOSLROTC .138 (.346) .117 (.322) .121 (.326)
LOSELOCS .167 (.373) .274 (.446) .253 (.435)
USNA .400 (.491) .280 (.449) .303 (.460)
NESEP .004 (.060) .003 (.050) .003 (.052)
PERSONAL DEMOGRAPHICS
FEMALE .028 (.166) .018 (.131) .020 (.139)
MALE .972 (.166) .982 (.131) .980 (.138)
MINORITY .064 (.245) .085 (.278) .081 (.272)
AGENOW 31.5 (1.92) 32.4 (2.76) 32.2 (2.64)
MARONLY .270 (.445) .246 (.431) .251 (.433)
MARCHILD .535 (.500) .518 (.500) .521 (.500)
DIVCHILD .012 (.103) .023 (.151) .021 (.143)
SINGLE .184 (.389) .213 (.410) .207 (.405)
NAVY EXPERIENCE












NOCOMBAT .050 (.216) .090 (.287) .083 (.275)
NODEPHD .160 (.367) .291 (.456) .266 (.442)
EOOWQUAL .535 (.500) .463 (.499) .477 (.500)
TAOQUAL .376 (.485) .294 (.456) .309 (.462)
EARSWO .677 (.468) .548 (.498) .573 (.495)
EAREOOW .174 (.380) .091 (.288) .107 (.309)
EARTAO .035 (.182) .008 (.086) .013 (.113)
ACADEMIC PROFILE
GPA 2.76 (.852) 2.54 (.936) 2.58 (.923)
MATHSKILL 3.57 (1.09) 2.82 (1.55) 2.96 (1.50)
TECHSKILL 1.68 (1.37) 1.10 (1.33) 1.21 (1.36)
ELIGCURR 11.9 (9.29) 9.97 (8.39) 10.3 (8.60)
FY OF 0-4 SELECTION BOARD
FYSB85 .043 (.202) .056 (.230) .053 (.225)
FYSB86 .181 (.386) .198 (.399) .195 (.396)
FYSB87 .234 (.426) .182 (.386) .192 (.394)
FYSB88 .153 (.360) .136 (.343) .139 (.347)
FYSB89 .188 (.391) .236 (.425) .227 (.419)
FYSB90 .199 (.400) .192 (.394) .193 (.395)
TREATMENT VARIABLE
FFGE .191 (.393)
Table III further reveals that performance on ENS/LTJG
FITREPs (EPCTREP) may be an important factor in FFGE
selection, since those who ultimately were selected for
graduate education were more likely to have been recommended
for accelerated promotion on their early FITREPs. Mean values
of commissioning source and college quality reveal that Naval
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Academy graduates are the most likely to be selected for FFGE,
comprising 40 percent of the subsample of officers with FFGE
and only 28 percent of those without. OCS commissioned
officers from lower quality colleges (LOSELOCS) are least
likely to be selected, comprising only 16.7 percent of those
with FFGE and 27 percent of those without. Although females
comprise only 2 percent of the whole sample, they represent
2.8 percent of all those selected for FFGE, suggesting that a
greater proportion of females are selected for fully- funded
graduate education. A lower percentage of minorities, 2
percentage points less, are selected for FFGE compared to
those without; and selection for FFGE seems to favor officers
who are married (with or without children) compared to those
who are divorced or single.
As mentioned in Chapter III, academic experience and
professional performance are important criteria for selection
into the Navy's FFGE program. Table III seems to support this
criteria in that, among FFGE officers, those with an early SWO
qualification, an early EOOW qualification, and an early TAO
qualification are more heavily represented. Furthermore,
those selected for FFGE have higher averages in all three
Academic Profile Code areas, with the largest difference in
math skills, and are eligible for an average of two more NPS
curricula than those without FFGE.
The increase in the percentage of officers selected for
FFGE during fiscal year promotion board 1987 and 1988 most
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likely can be attributed to the increased emphasis in graduate
education just after fiscal year 1985, when the Navy
experienced difficulty meeting graduate education quotas. 15
Cross -tabulations of explanatory variable categories by
each of the three performance measures further substantiates
the consistent superior performance (in promotion and
percentage of LT FITREPs recommended for early promotion) for
officers with fully- funded graduate education. However, the
third performance measure, indicating whether or not the last
LT FITREP received an early recommendation for promotion,
seems to be somewhat inconsistent compared to the other two.
Table IV illustrates performance differences between those
with FFGE and those without for each performance measure by
commissioning source, personal demographics, and Navy
experience.
As can be seen in Table IV, officers with FFGE generally
tend to perform better in promotion and LPCTREP regardless of
the commissioning source, personal demographics, and extent of
Navy experience. Contrary to the first two performance
measures, performance on the LASTLTRP seems to be somewhat
unpredictable, where a higher percentage of officers without
FFGE received early promotion recommendations on their last LT
FITREP in all three of the explanatory variable categories.
15 In the Navy Graduate Education Program Status Report for
FY 19 84, prepared by the Naval Postgraduate School, references are
made to the chronic difficulties the Navy experienced with meeting
graduate education quotas between years 1979 and 1983. [Ref. 18]
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This could imply that using a single FITREP, regardless of how
important it is, may not be as reliable or encompassing in
evaluating an officer's overall performance.
TABLE IV. PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES BY GRADUATE EDUCATION












HISLROTC 93.5 77.1 77.7 67.5 87.0 80.1
HISELOCS 94.4 80.42 81.2 70.5 80.6 81.5
LOSLROTC 92.3 77.1 75.8 66.0 84.6 82.1
LOSELOCS 91.5 75.8 72.2 68.9 76.6 81.7
NESEP " 100.0 66.7 100.0 58.2 100.0 100.0
USNA 98.2 80.9 83.9 72.8 92.9 83.6
FEMALE " 100.0 90.5 83.5 66.2 75.0 81.0
MALE 94.9 78.1 79.8 69.7 86.9 82.0
MINORITY 88.9 73.3 83.3 59.4 94.4 72.3
WHITE 95.5 78.8 79.2 70.6 86.0 82.9
MARONLY 94.7 77.2 76.5 71.1 84.2 87.1
MARCHILD 95.4 80.8 82.5 70.6 91.4 82.6
DIVCHILD " 100.0 75.0 86.7 57.2 100.0 71.4
SINGLE 94.2 74.0 74.8 66.9 75.0 76.0
NUC 100.0 95.7 78.9 71.2 85.2 88.0
NON-NUC 94.5 76.9 79.6 69.5 86.7 81.5
NOCOMBAT 100.0 51.9 82.9 53.7 85.7 70.4
COMBAT 94.8 81.0 79.3 71.2 86.6 83.2
NODEPHD 93.3 52.6 77.3 57.7 80.0 70.1
DEPHD 95.4 88.9 79.9 74.5 87.8 86.9
EOOWQUAL 96.7 89.0 85.0 76.0 91.4 89.0












TAOQUAL 100.0 90.9 87.3 79.7 93.4 92.3
NOTAOQUAL 92.1 73.1 74.8 65.4 82.4 77.3
EARSWO 95.8 83.4 82.1 76.2 86.4 84.4
NOEARSWO 93.4 72.2 74.1 61.7 86.8 79.1
EAREOOW 91.8 89.9 81.9 77.6 85.7 90.8
NOEAREOOW 95.7 77.2 79.0 68.8 86.7 81.1
EARTAO ~ 100.0 77.8 100.0 90.4 100.0 100.0
NOEARTAO 94.9 78.3 78.8 69.5 86.0 81.9
All figures are in percentages.
** Observations represent less than 3 percent of the sample
.
More specifically, Table IV illustrates that USNA
graduates, with or without FFGE, tend to perform better than
ROTC and OCS commissioned officers, regardless of
undergraduate college quality. This holds true for all three
performance measures. Additionally, OCS officers, with or
without FFGE who attended a highly competitive undergraduate
college seem to outperform ROTC officers in promotion and
LPCTREP; however, OCS officers who attended a less competitive
college tend to perform the worst in all three performance
measures
.
Personal demographic characteristics cross -tabulated with
performance measures reveal that females with or without FFGE,
although representing only 2 percent of the sample, tend to
outperform males with and without FFGE in promotion by 5 and
12 percentage points, respectively. In the LPCTREP measure,
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females with FFGE outperform males with FFGE by 4 percentage
points. However, males with or without FFGE seem to fare
better in the LASTLTRP performance measure. The cross
-
tabulation further reveals that minority Surface Warfare
officers generally perform more poorly on all three
performance measures, unless he/she has FFGE; minorities with
FFGE outperformed whites with FFGE in the LPCTREP and LASTLTRP
performance measures. Although outside the scope of this
thesis, an interesting question is why minorities with FFGE
fail to promote as favorably as whites with FFGE, even though
they maintain higher fitness report scores. This is a topic
for further research. Finally, officers married with children
generally perform better than officers married with no
children, divorced, or single.
With the exception of fitness report performance, the
extent of one's Navy experience is probably the most revealing
factor in each performance measure. Table IV reveals an
interesting trend within Navy experience, indicating that
certain attributes considered as career- enhancing have a
stronger effect on performance measures for non-FFGE officers
than for FFGE officers. Non-FFGE officers having one or more
of the following attributes -- nuclear power trained, served
on a CRUDES ship, attended Department Head school, EOOW
qualified, TAO qualified, and received an early SWO, EOOW, or
TAO qualification -- averaged at least 10 percentage points
better on all three . performance measures than non-FFGE
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officers without the preceding attributes. On the other hand,
performance measure differences for officers with FFGE
possessing career enhancing attributes compared to those
without the attributes were much smaller in magnitude,
suggesting that attainment of a fully- funded graduate
education may compensate for failure to achieve certain
qualifications and experience vital in a Surface Warfare
officer's career. For example, non-FFGE officers who attended
Department Head school promoted 34 percentage points higher
than non-FFGE officers who did not attend Department Head
school, while FFGE officers with Department Head school
promoted only 2 percentage points higher than FFGE officers
without Department Head school. Similar differences are
evident within each of the other two performance measures and
throughout all the Navy experience variables.
In concluding the bivariate analysis, Tables III and IV
clearly suggest that attainment of a fully- funded graduate
education is advantageous in promotion to 0-4 and contributes
to receiving early promotion recommendations on LT FITREPs.
However, the impact of FFGE on receiving an early promotion
recommendation on the last LT FITREP is questionable.
Although this form of analysis is suggestive, in order to
obtain a more reliable estimate of the impact of fully- funded
graduate education on the performance measures, one must
simultaneously incorporate the effects of all the explanatory
variables by holding each constant. A more advanced
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statistical technique, multivariate regression analysis,
enables one to do this and is the subject of the next section.
B. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Four main models, discussed in the methodology section of
Chapter III, are used to evaluate the impact of fully- funded
graduate education on Surface Warfare officer performance.
The dependent variable, FFGE, for the selection model is coded
=1 for those with fully- funded graduate education and =0
otherwise. Since the dependent variable is binary, a maximum
likelihood technique is used to estimate a probit model of
selection for fully- funded graduate education. The first
performance model uses the "in- zone" or "below- zone" promotion
outcome to 0-4 as the dependent variable and is estimated
using a logit model, where PR0M0TE=1 for those who are
promoted and =0 otherwise. The second performance measure
uses the percent of LT FITREPs receiving an early promotion
recommendation (LPCTREP) as the dependent variable. Since the
dependent variable is continuous, the model is estimated using
linear ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques.
The third performance measure uses the recommendation for
early promotion on the last LT FITREP as the dependent
variable. This dependent variable, LASTLTRP, is coded =1 if
the officer's last LT FITREP received a RAP and =0 otherwise.
Since the dependent variable is binary, the logit technique is
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used to estimate the model. 16 This section presents the
multivariate results of the selection model and the three
performance models, where the specifications were defined in
Chapter III. 17
A separate table is presented for each estimated model and
displays the signs and magnitudes of the estimated
coefficients, the t- statistics, and, for the nonlinear models,
the change in probabilities associated with a one unit change
in each explanatory variable; holding other variables
constant
.
1. Estimates of the Selection Model
As was discussed in Chapters II and III, the selection
probit is vital in determining the presence of selectivity
bias associated with selection into the Navy's fully- funded
graduate education program. The probit incorporates the
unobserved factors gathered from the error structure, which is
16 Nonlinear probit or logit functional forms are superior to
linear OLS functions when the dependent variable is binary because
they constrain the predicted values to the unit interval (0,1) so
that the expected value can be interpreted as the probability of
the event occurring. Although both nonlinear functions produce
similar results, the logit is preferred since it is easier to
interpret and convert to changes in probabilities. [Ref . 19] The
probit is used for the FFGE selection model because of its ability
to incorporate unobserved characteristics -- hence the model of
choice in the first stage of the two- stage procedures to deal with
selectivity bias.
17 William H. Greene's Econometric Software package, LIMDEP,
was used to obtain estimates for all models in this thesis. [Ref.
15] Greene is considered one of the best known sources for
econometric techniques currently "in vogue."
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based on the calculated probability of selection into FFGE
associated with each observation, into an additional term
called LAMBDA. 18 This term is then used in the performance
models to adjust for potential selectivity bias in the
estimated effect of graduate education on performance.
Table V displays the results of the probit selection
model, the specification of which was expressed mathematically
in Chapter II. The specification of the model was discussed
further in Chapter III. In Table V, seven of the eight
variables used to explain FFGE selection were statistically
significant. The positive signs of the significant variables
indicated significant positive impacts on the likelihood of
selection for fully- funded graduate education. Out of the
three variables comprising the Academic Profile Code,
performance in math (MATHSKIL) seemed to be the most
important, with a one percent increase in math index score
increasing the probability of FFGE attainment by 4.4 percent.
Performance on early (ENS/LTJG) FITREPs and attaining an early
TAO qualification had the largest impact on selection for
FFGE, with a one percent increase in the percent of early
FITREPs recommended for early promotion increasing the
probability of selection by 10.8 percent; an officer with an
early TAO qualification was 16.8 percent more likely to be
selected.
18 See Section D of Chapter II for mathematical
interpretation of obtaining LAMBDA.
85






GPA .110 (2.19) " .027
MATHSKIL .176 (4.79) " .044
TECHSKIL .054 (1.51) .013
EPCTREP .439 (5.37) " .108
ELIGCURR .013 (2.65) ~ .003
EARSWO .264 (3.12) "" .065
EAREOOW .307 (2.58) "" .076
EARTAO .680 (2.19) * .168
INTERCEPT -2.36 (-12.43)
CHI -SQUARE LOG LIKELIHOOD 149.88**
PREDICTION RATIO 3 81.0%
1 t- statistic in parentheses measures significance of coefficient.
2 Calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficient by the
density of the standard normal distribution function corresponding to
the particular probability level, as given by the cumulative normal
distribution function for which the change is being evaluated. [Ref
.
19]
3 Ratio of correct predictions over total number of observations
.
Note: 98.6% of those without FFGE were correctlv predicted, but only
6.7% of those with FFGE were predicted correctly. Additionally, out
of the actual 19% that had FFGE, the model only predicted a mere 2.4%
to have FFGE.
Significant at the .05 level.
"" Significant at the .01 level.
In evaluating the goodness -of -fit of the model, the
chi-square log- likelihood statistic is used to test a null
hypothesis that all variables are simultaneously equal to
zero. Although this test is considered weak because a model
rarely, if ever, fails to meet the criteria, the Log-
Likelihood value of 149.88 was highly significant (at the .01
level) , which rejects the null statistically and indicates
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that the included variables are related as a whole to FFGE
selection.
The predictive ability of the model, indicated by the
prediction ratio, is another way to evaluate model fit. Since
the selection model correctly predicted 81 percent of those
with and without FFGE, the model appears to be reasonably
accurate. However, further analysis of correct prediction
percentages revealed that 98.6 percent of those without FFGE
were predicted correctly, but the model was only able to
correctly predict 6.7 percent of those with FFGE. Although 19
percent of the sample actually had FFGE, the model predicted
a dismal 2.4 percent to have FFGE. These poor prediction
percentages may reduce the effectiveness of the procedures
used to correct for potential bias associated with FFGE
selection.
While the variables included in this model appear to
be important, we still do not know how accurate this selection
model is as a representation of the true selection process via
which individuals choose, and the Navy decides to assign
individuals to graduate education programs. In particular,
other important variables relevant to the selection process
are likely omitted, which could bias the effect of the
included variables. [Ref . 16] The key issue is whether the
true selection process has been captured by this model.
Unfortunately, the "true" selection model is unknown. For the
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purposes of testing for selectivity bias, we will assume this
model accurately captures this process.
2 . Estimates of the Promotion Model
Table VI displays the estimated logit coefficients
from the four alternative specifications of the 0-4 promotion
model. The specifications are designed to illustrate the
marginal effect of the impact of FFGE on promotion as observed
and unobserved factors are introduced into the equation. The
first model specification measures the total effect of FFGE on
promotion by using FFGE as the only explanatory variable, and
the second measures the direct effect by including additional
observed factors that may impact promotion. The last two
model specifications are developed from two techniques used to
determine and correct for the presence of the potential bias
associated with fully- funded graduate education selection by
incorporating into the model unobserved factors and
probabilities for FFGE selection for each observation (the
selection approaches are discussed fully in Chapter II)
.
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CHI -SQUARED LL 53.18"" 577.79*" 577.83** 569.28**
PREDICTION RATIO 81.5 % 89.2 % 89.1 % 88.6 %
1 First figure is logit coefficient estimate, the t-statistic is in
parentheses, and the change in probability obtained by multiplying
the coefficient by Px(l-P) is in brackets, where P is percent of
sample promoted (.815). [Ref. 19]
Significant at the .05 level.
*" Significant at the .01 level.
a. Total Effect of FFGE
The first column in Table VI displays the results
of the total effect of FFGE on promotion. As can be seen,
having fully- funded graduate education was highly significant
in this model specification. If one were to consider FFGE as
the only factor explaining promotion to 0-4, then an officer
with FFGE would be 25.2 percent more likely to promote,
compared to an officer without FFGE. However, as discussed in
Chapter III, there are other observed or measurable factors
that contribute to promotion.
b. Effect of FFGE with Observed Factors
The second column of Table VI displays the results
of the direct effect of FFGE on promotion to 0-4 after
including numerous other explanatory variables that have both
a direct impact on promotion and an indirect impact on
selection for FFGE. As can be seen, although still highly
significant, the magnitude of the impact of FFGE on promotion
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has decreased dramatically compared to the impact in the total
effect specification. Inclusion of the observed factors in
the model approximately halved the probability of promotion
for FFGE officers, or by 11.6 percentage points, from 25.2
percent in the total effect specification to only 13.6 percent
in the specification with observed factors. Cymrot's study on
the effects of graduate education on promotion, presented in
Chapter II [Ref. 2], revealed a 26 percent increase in the
probability of promotion to 0-4. However, his model suffered
from misspecification due to the mixing of officers from all
communities, which can mask important community- specific
factors, and not accounting for other observed factors
significant in explaining promotion, such as fitness reports
and Navy experience. He included only personal demographics,
time in rank, service continuity, and officer community
designator.
Of the other observed factors included in the
specification in column 2 of Table VI, 13 had statistically
significant impacts on promotion. The percent of LT FITREPs
recommended for early promotion (LPCTREP) had the largest
effect, with a one percent increase in this percentage
increasing the probability of promotion to 0-4 by 32.3
percent, while a one percent increase in the percent of
"early" FITREPs RAP'd was associated with only a 15.4 percent
increase in promotion probability. Personal demographic
variables revealed significant effects on promotion for
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females, who were 45.4 percent more likely to promote than
males, and those married with children, who were 9.2 percent
more likely to promote than single officers. All but one of
the Navy experience variables (EARSWO) had significant effects
on promotion. Nuclear officers were 3 6.2 percent more likely
to promote than conventional officers; officers not serving on
a CRUDES ship were 18.4 percent less likely to promote; not
attending Department Head school before the 0-4 promotion
board decreased the probability of promotion by 27.1 percent;
and achieving an EOOW or TAO qualification increased one's
promotion probability by 10 percent. Finally, there were
significant positive fiscal year effects for 1985, 1986, and
1987 (compared to 1990) . Given these significant variables,
the multivariate results seem to be consistent with the
bivariate indications.
c. Heckman Approach
The third column of Table VI displays the results
of the Heckman approach, the first of two techniques used to
correct for potential selection bias. Coefficient estimates
for all the observed factors, including signs and measure of
significance are nearly identical to those in the model
specification in column 2 with one notable exception, the
estimated effect of FFGE. The introduction of unobserved
factors (contained in LAMBDA) based on the probability of FFGE
selection for each officer, obtained from the probit selection
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model, resulted in FFGE having an insignificant impact on
promotion. A change in the significance of the treatment
variable (FFGE) is generally an indication that selection bias
was present in the model and a statistically significant
estimate of the correction factor (LAMBDA) would provide
confirmation. However, the estimate for LAMBDA was
insignificant -- that is, no selection bias was detected.
Due to the insignificance of LAMBDA, very little
can be said concerning the implications of the change in the
FFGE estimate. Although the results of the Heckman procedure
implies that FFGE adds no value to promotion, the inability to
identify (predict) those officers with FFGE in the selection
model reduces the level of confidence placed on the results of
the Heckman procedure. Since detection of selection bias is
highly dependent on an accurate specification of the selection
probit, one can only speculate that there are unidentified
variables omitted from the probit selection model that would
help to explain FFGE selection more accurately.
d. Barnow Approach
The fourth column of Table VI displays the results
of an alternative technique to correct for the presence of
potential selection bias. As discussed in Chapter III,
instead of using FFGE, this model specification utilizes the
calculated probabilities of FFGE selection for each officer,
obtained from the selection probit, in a new explanatory term
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called PHAT. This purges the equation of any endogeneity
between promotion and FFGE; which could potentially bias the
estimate of FFGE on promotion. i
As was the case in the Heckman approach, the
coefficient estimates, signs, and measure of significance for
all the observed factors are nearly identical to those
obtained in column 2. The coefficient of PHAT was similar to
that of FFGE in the Heckman model, positive but statistically
insignificant. Again, given the poor predictive ability of
the selection probit, the reliability of this model is
somewhat questioned.
3 . Estimates of the Percent RAP of LT FITREPs Model
Table VII displays the ordinary least squares (OLS)
model results for each of the four specifications of the
impact of FFGE on the percent of LT FITREPs receiving an early
promotion recommendation. Since most officers attain FFGE at
the five or six-year point, this measure intends to evaluate
post -FFGE performance. As in the promotion model, the four
model specifications are designed to illustrate the marginal
effect of FFGE on LT FITREP performance as observed, and then































































































































































ADJUSTED R- SQUARED 2 .012 .156 .157 .156
F- STATISTIC 2 19.17"* 14.66*" 14.04** 14.66"*
1 First figure is OLS coefficient estimate and represents the
percent change of LT FITREPs rapped associated with a one unit
increase in the variable, the t- statistic is in parentheses.
2 Adjusted R-Squared and F-Statistic indicate goodness -of -fit for a
linear model estimated by OLS.
* Significant at the . 05 level
.
"* Significant at the .01 level.
a. Total Effect of FFGE
Column 1 of Table VII displays the results of the
total effect of FFGE on the percent of LT FITREPs receiving a
RAP (LPCTREP) . As Table VII shows, FFGE had a significant
positive impact on LPCTREP, when used as the only explanatory
variable. Officers with FFGE received 11.3 percent more LT
FITREPs with a recommendation for early promotion. In order
to obtain a more accurate estimate of the effect of FFGE on
LPCTREP, other observed factors that also effect LPCTREP must
be incorporated into the model
.
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b. Effect of FFGE with Observed Factors
Column 2 of Table VII displays the results of the
direct effect of FFGE on the percent of LT FITREPs receiving
early promotion recommendations after including numerous other
explanatory variables that have both a direct impact on
LPCTREP and an indirect impact on selection for FFGE. The
statistical insignificance of FFGE in column 2 implies that
FFGE plays a negligible role in determining LT FITREP
performance when other observed explanatory factors are
included in the model. This result seems to conflict with
what was implied in the bivariate analysis, where officers
with FFGE appeared to perform significantly better on LT
FITREPs in all the variables. It should be noted, however,
the value that FFGE adds to the propensity of attaining early
promotion recommendations on LT FITREPs cannot be discounted,
due to the fact that FFGE became insignificant only after
accounting for Navy experience in the model.
Of the other observed factors, only early FITREP
performance and Navy experience variables had statistically
significant impacts on LPCTREP. A one percent increase in the
percent of early (ENS/LTJG) FITREPs recommended for early
promotion (EPCTREP) was associated with a 12.6 percent
increase in LPCTREP. The significant Navy experience
variables revealed that not serving on a CRUDES ship and not
attending Department Head school decreased LPCTREP by 9 . 7 and
13.9 percentage points, respectively; achieving an early SWO
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qualification, an EOOW qualification, and a TAO qualification
increased LPCTREP by 11.3, 8.9, and 6.1 percentage points,
respectively. Although the adjusted R- squared was fairly low,
the F- statistic was highly significant at the .01 level,
indicating a good fit.
c. Heckman Approach
Column 3 of Table VII displays the results obtained
when incorporating unobserved factors based on the
probabilities of FFGE selection for each officer into the
model to correct for potential selection bias. The parameter
estimates and statistical significance of all the observed
factors, except for FFGE, were nearly identical to those
obtained in column 2. As was the case in the promotion model,
the correction factor (LAMBDA) and FFGE were statistically
insignificant to the .05 level; however, the change in sign
(to negative) of the FFGE variable and the somewhat high t-
scores for both FFGE and LAMBDA (>1.0), suggests that
attainment of a FFGE degree could possibly hurt post -FFGE




Column 4 in Table VII displays the results of the
second technique used to correct for potential selection bias
in the LPCTREP model. As in the Heckman estimates in column
3, the parameter estimates and statistical significance for
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all the observed factors, except FFGE, were virtually
identical to those obtained in column 2. As was the case in
the promotion model, the impact of FFGE, represented by the
probability of attaining FFGE (PHAT) , was statistically
insignificant after correcting for the endogeneity of
selection for FFGE. Consistent with the Heckman approach, the
impact of FFGE became negative, although statistically
insignificant, suggesting that FFGE could be detrimental to
post -FFGE FITREP performance.
4. Estimates of the Last LT FITREP RAP Model
Table VIII displays the logit model results for each
of the four model specifications used to measure the marginal
effect of FFGE on the probability of receiving an early
promotion recommendation on the last LT FITREP. As discussed
in Chapter III, this single FITREP is used as a performance
measure because it evaluates post -FFGE performance and
completes a trend of either declining, improving, or sustained
LT FITREP performance crucial in determining promotion to 0-4.
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CHI -SQUARED LL 3.44 156.56" 156. se- 155.96"*
PREDICTION RATIO 82.9 % 83.5 % ss. 5 % 83.5 %
1 First figure is logit coefficient estimate, the t- statistic is in
parentheses, and the change in probability obtained by multiplying
the coefficient by Px(l-P) is in brackets, where P is the percent of
the sample receiving a RAP (.829)
.
Significant at the .05 level.
** Significant at the .01 level.
a. Total Effect of FFGE
Column 1 of Table VIII displays the logit results
when FFGE is used as the only explanatory variable for the
probability of receiving an early promotion recommendation on
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the last LT FITREP (LASTLTRP) . As discussed in Chapter III,
the significance of FFGE in this total effect specification
merely establishes a relationship between the performance
measure and FFGE. Although FFGE had a rather high t- score, it
was statistically insignificant to the .05 level. It is
likely that FFGE will have no effect on LASTLTRP within the
three remaining model specifications, due to its poor
representation in the total effect specification. Although
the predictive ability of the specification was good, with a
correct prediction ratio of 82.9 percent, the low Chi -Square
statistic of only 3.44 was insignificant, indicating a poor
fit.
b. Effect of FFGE with Observed Factors
Column 2 of Table VIII displays the LASTLTRP logit
results after including other observed factors that help to
explain whether or not a SWO receives an early promotion
recommendation on the last LT FITREP. As expected, FFGE had
a statistically insignificant impact, which seems to be
consistent with the bivariate analysis, where the mean
LASTLTRP performance differences between those with and
without FFGE were not that great. Of the statistically
significant variables, achieving a TAO qualification before
the 0-4 promotion board had the largest impact: the
probability of receiving a RAP on the last LT FITREP was 13.1
percent higher for those with a TAO qualification, early
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FITREP performance (EPCTREP) had a highly significant positive
effect on LASTLTRP, with a one percent increase in EPCTREP
increasing the probability of receiving a RAP by 10.3
percentage points. Other significant variables revealed that
minorities were 7 percent less likely to receive a RAP on the
last LT FITREP, married with or without children increased the
likelihood of receiving a RAP by 8.2 and 10.6 percent,
respectively, not attending Department Head School decreased
the likelihood by 10 percent, and attaining an EOOW
qualification increased the likelihood by 10 percent. The
predictive ability of the model in column 2 was good, with a
correct prediction ratio of 83.5 percent, and a highly
significant Chi-Square of 156.56 indicated a good fit.
c. Heckman Approach
Column 3 of Table VIII displays the logit results
after introducing the selectivity bias correction factor
(LAMBDA) , which accounts for unobserved factors taken from the
error term that may effect both the likelihood of receiving an
early promotion recommendation on the last LT FITREP and the
probability of FFGE selection for each officer. The
coefficient estimates and statistical significance for all the
explanatory variables were nearly identical to those obtained
in column 2 . As was the case in the first two performance
measure models in Tables VI and VII, both LAMBDA and FFGE were
insignificant, indicating that selection bias was not a
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factor. The insignificance of the correction factor, which
again may be attributable to the poor predictive ability of
the FFGE selection model, essentially renders the
interpretation of the treatment variable (FFGE) meaningless.
d. Barnow Approach
Column 4 of Table VIII displays the logit results
after attempting to purge the model of endogeneity that may
exist between FFGE selection and receiving an early promotion
recommendation on the last LT FITREP, which could bias the
FFGE estimate. Instead of using FFGE, the probability of FFGE
selection for each officer (PHAT) was used as an instrumental
variable in this model specification. Statistically
significant variables were the same as those obtained in
column 2 . As was the case in the previous two performance
models, the variable used to measure the impact of FFGE on
LASTLTRP and to correct for potential selection bias, PHAT,
was insignificant. This indicates that the probabilities of
FFGE selection had a negligible impact on receiving a RAP on
the last LT FITREP.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter summarizes the conclusions drawn from the
empirical analysis of this thesis. The chapter also proposes
recommendations for further research into the effects of
graduate education on officer performance.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The results from the estimates of the FFGE probit
selection model supported the CNO's three criteria for
selection into the fully- funded graduate education program.
The statistical significance of GPA, math skills, and number
of NPS curricula eligible supported the undergraduate academic
performance criteria; the statistical significance of percent
of early FITREPs receiving an early promotion recommendation
supported the greater promotion potential criteria; and the
statistical significance of attaining early SWO, EOOW, or TAO
qualifications supported the superior professional performance
criteria. However, the ability of the model to predict
officers with FFGE turned out to be very poor, most likely due
to the inadvertent omission of important unobservable factors.
Among these are: quota availability, detailer requirements,
personal preferences, community pressures, and motivation.
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The results of this thesis provided answers to some
important questions concerning the effect of fully- funded
graduate education on Surface Warfare: Officer performance.
First, as illustrated in Table VI, Chapter IV, fully- funded
graduate education is significantly related to promotion to 0-
4. Even after holding constant all other possible observable
factors that would have an impact on promotion, FFGE remained
a highly significant and positive determinant of the
probability of promotion. From a promotion standpoint,
leaving the warfare environment to attain FFGE appears to be
career- enhancing. Although FFGE plays a significant role in
promotion, LT FITREP performance and attending Department Head
School were more highly significant in explaining promotion to
0-4. It is also interesting to note, even though officers
technically have no control over it, those who served on
CRUDES ships appear to have an advantage over those who never
served on a CRUDES ship. This could add some "steam" to
claims of institutional bias within the Surface Warfare
community.
Secondly, as illustrated in Tables VII and VIII in Chapter
IV, fully- funded graduate education has a statistically
insignificant impact on receiving early promotion
recommendations on LT FITREPs. Although the distribution of
officers with and without FFGE by performance measures,
displayed in Figure 1 in Chapter I, suggested that FFGE causes
better performance on LT FITREPs, when all other observable
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factors are held constant, FFGE became insignificant in both





It should be noted, however, in the percent of LT FITREPs
RAP model, that FFGE became insignificant only after the Navy-
experience variables were added to the model. This implies
that both FFGE and Navy experience are, in fact, correlated
with receiving a RAP on LT FITREPs, although Navy experience
factors carry more weight in determining this performance
measure. Consistent with the promotion model, the two FITREP
performance models indicated that previous (early) FITREP
performance and attending Department Head School were also
very important factors in explaining early promotion
recommendations. Additionally, although professional
qualifications (EOOW, TAO) were also significant in the
promotion model, they seemed to have a greater effect on
FITREP performance, compared to promotion. From a FITREP
performance perspective, in light of the insignificant effect
of FFGE on LT FITREP performance, and considering that most of
the "observed" LT FITREPs are evaluated after FFGE attainment,
it can be concluded that leaving the warfare environment to
attain a fully- funded graduate degree neither contributes nor
detracts from Surface Warfare career -enhancement, as measured
by fitness reports.
Finally, as discussed in Chapter II, the military measures
productivity through "performance within rank (FITREPs)
,
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promotion, and retention. The contention of the theory of
human capital investment that formal education increases
productivity appears to be supported; the FFGE variable was
highly significant in the promotion measure of performance.
However, the question of whether graduate education alone
accounts for the increased productivity has yet to be
answered, due to the inability to completely isolate FFGE from
unobserved factors suspected of potential selection bias.
Thus, the pay-off to the Navy from its investment in fully-
funded graduate education remains unclear, due to the fact
that those officers promoted with FFGE are already considered
more promotable and may have been promoted even if they had
not attained FFGE (i.e., selection bias). This leads us to
the results obtained from the two approaches used to determine
and correct for potential selection bias associated with FFGE
selection.
Given the statistical significance of the observed factors
included in the selection model, one could conclude that
selection for FFGE is not random and that selection bias would
be inevitable, causing the coefficient of the FFGE variable to
be overestimated in the performance models. However, both of
the techniques used to determine and correct for potential
selection bias (the Heckman and Barnow approaches) found
little evidence that selectivity was a problem. Although the
confidence in the results of these selection bias models is
much degraded, due to the poor predictive ability of the FFGE
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selection probit, the selection correction factor (LAMBDA)
,
from the Heckman approach, and the probability of selection
for FFGE (PHAT) , from the Barnow approach, both had
statistically insignificant effects in the three performance
models. These two techniques attempted to account for the
possibility that officers chosen for FFGE were better
performers, more highly motivated, with a higher desire for
achievement and, thus, more promotable. These techniques were
unable to capture these unobservables, hence, the
insignificant effect of selection bias.
As discussed in the section on selectivity bias in Chapter
II, the ability to detect and correct for selection bias is
highly dependent on an accurate specification of the selection
model . It is reasonable to conclude that the FFGE selection
model adequately captured the important observable
(measurable) factors in the selection process; however, the
inability to account for unmeasurable factors such as billet
availability, detailing priorities, personal preferences, and
individual career intentions may have seriously downgraded the
accuracy of the selection model to fully capture the Navy's
actual FFGE selection process. Again, the selection model was
only able to predict 6.7 percent of those actually with FFGE.
In light of this fact, one should not impulsively conclude
from this thesis that FFGE has no value added to SWO
performance. Consequently, the issue of whether the increase
in productivity is attributable to fully- funded graduate
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education alone, observable factors, and/or unobservable
factors requires further research.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Until this thesis, no known attempt has been made to model
selection for fully- funded graduate education. The FFGE
selection model in this thesis sufficiently captures observed
(measurable) factors that significantly impact selection for
FFGE, but apparently do not contribute to any bias that may be
associated with those officers selected for FFGE. Further
research on the FFGE selection process is recommended, for it
is possible that selection bias may lie within factors
unavailable in the data set used for this thesis. The data
for this study classified selection for FFGE only if the
officer had attained a fully- funded graduate degree. The
population was all Surface Warfare Officers regardless of
whether they were qualified for graduate education, or were
given the option to pursue it. Individual preferences is an
important factor in FFGE selection and may be captured by
obtaining data on all officers who qualify for FFGE and on
those who are offered it. This approach would involve
analyzing individual decisions to accept graduate education
among the population of those qualified who were offered the
option to attend graduate education. Timing of one's transfer
may also be significant in the selection process - - FFGE may
not be available or offered to an individual who is
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transferring in the middle or right after the beginning of an
academic quarter or semester. Although difficult, accounting
for these factors in the selection process, which can also be
applied to other Navy communities, should be the goal of
future research.
This thesis utilized data that provided career "snapshots"
of individual officers at the 0-3 and 0-4 promotion board
points. Retrospective data were then assembled on these
officers. A longitudinal analysis of cohort data would reveal
a great deal more information on performance of individual
officers by enabling the researcher to follow them through
their career.
Subspecialty codes are acquired in conjunction with the
attainment of a fully- funded graduate degree. It would be
fruitful to graduate education policy makers to incorporate
technical and nontechnical subspecialty degrees in the
performance analysis to determine if there are differences
across subspecialty types. This could indicate which
subspecialties are more cost effective to the Navy.
The bivariate analysis in Table IV of Chapter IV revealed
that minorities with FFGE failed to promote as favorably as
whites with FFGE, even though they maintained higher LT FITREP
RAP percentages. Although the multivariate analysis found
that minorities were statistically insignificant, in light of
the current emphasis on minority issues within the military,
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it is recommended that minority promotion rates be explored
further.
Only one community (Surface Warfare) was chosen for
analysis in this thesis. Due to the differences in how
different communities evaluate officers, sharp differences in
career paths between communities, and the lack of comparable
Navy experience factors, it is recommended that future
research efforts analyze the effect of fully- funded graduate
education on other communities (remaining URL, GURL, RL, and
Staff Corps) utilizing identical performance measures and
modeling techniques utilized in this thesis.
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APPENDIX
As discussed at the end of Chapter III, the decision to
leave the service at the completion of one's initial tour of
obligation represents an additional level of selection,
preceding FFGE selection, that may effect the outcome of the
three performance models. That is, the sample of officers
considered for promotion to 0-4 is truncated since they
represent only those officers remaining in the Navy through
the 0-4 promotion point. Hence, assuming that both levels of
selection are independent from one another, a multiple
selection approach using correction factors for both
separation and fully- funded graduate education is illustrated
below. 19
Table IX displays the results of a probit model used to
explain separation behavior, where SEP=1 if the officer left
the Navy voluntarily before the 0-4 board, else SEP=0. The
interservice separation code (ISC) was used to identify
voluntary leavers, all other leavers and those leaving the SWO
community but remaining in the Navy were omitted from the
19 Greene's econometric software, LIMDEP, addresses dual selection
with the specification of a bivariate probit with selection model . From
this procedure, a term called RHO is obtained and its statistical
significance indicates whether the two selection processes are
interdependent (RHO significant) , or independent (RHO insignificant)
.
However, due to the nature of the selection process in this study (the
sample being restricted to "stayers" only) , the two levels of selection
were treated as independent. [Ref . 15]
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analysis in an effort to capture true separation behavior.
Table X displays the results of each performance measure after
applying a dual selection approach using the Heckman
technique, where LAMBDA1 represents the selection correction
factor obtained from the separation probit and LAMBDA2
represents the selection correction factor obtained from the
FFGE selection probit displayed in Table V, Chapter IV.
As Table IX shows, the attributes significantly
contributing to the likelihood of separation prior to the 0-4
promotion board were: higher undergraduate GPA's; OCS
commissioned officers, especially those attending a less
competitive college, compared to USNA graduates; and never
having served on a CRUDES ship.
On the other hand, attributes significantly contributing
to the likelihood of remaining in the Navy were: receiving an
early promotion recommendation on early FITREPs; commissioned
through ROTC, compared to USNA; being female; age (where a one
year increase represented a 13 percent decrease in the
probability of separating) ; married with or without children
and divorced with children (compared to being single) ; nuclear
officers were 10.6 percent less likely to separate; and those
attaining a SWO qualification prior to promotion to 0-3 were
6.2 percent less likely to separate.
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EPCTREP -.305 (-4.89)'' ~ - .102
GPA .090 (2.74) " .030
HISLROTC -.215 (-2.53) ** - .072
HISELOCS .960 (10.24) ** .322
LOSLROTC -.191 (-1.89) - .064
LOSELOCS 1.34 (14.30) ~ .448
NESEP -.557 (-.696) - .187
FEMALE -1.78 (-8.12) " -.598
MINORITY -.026 (-.239) - .009
AGENOW -.387 (-27.99) *" - .130
MARONLY -.306 (-4.50) " - .103
MARCHILD -1.10 (-15.17) " -.369
DIVCHILD -.612 (-2.78) ~ -.205
NUC -.315 (-2.79) " -.106
NOCOMBAT 1.14 (13.44) " .383
EARSWO -.185 (-3.05) "* -.062
EAREOOW -.089 (-.905) -.030
EARTAO -.480 (-1.56) -.161
INTERCEPT 11.88 (27.85)
CHI -SQUARE LOG LIKELIHOOD 2530.00**
PREDICTION RATIO 4 87.2%
1 Where N=3,787 (1,477 stayed, 2,310 separated).
2 t- statistic in parentheses measures significance of coefficient.
3 Calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficient by the
density of the standard normal distribution function corresponding to
the particular probability level, as given by the cumulative normal
distribution function for which the change is being evaluated. [Ref
.
19]
4 Ratio of correct predictions over total number of observations
.
Note: 82.1% of those actually staying were correctly predicted. 90.4%
of those actually separating were predicted correctly. The model
also predicted that 62.2% of the sample would separate, while 61%
actually did.
Significant at the .05 level.
** Significant at the .01 level.
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In terms of the fit of the model, the chi- square log
likelihood statistic was highly significant and the model
correctly predicted 82.1 percent of those actually staying and
90.4 percent of those actually separating for a combined
prediction ratio of 87.2 percent. Combined with this
extremely high prediction ratio for those separating (relative
to the 6.7 percent obtained in the FFGE selection model), and
the fact that 13 of the 18 variables used to explain
separation behavior were highly significant (at least to the
.01 level), implies that the specification of the model is
accurate in capturing separation behavior and may be evaluated
as reliable.
TABLE X. ESTIMATES WITH THE DUAL-SELECTION HECKMAN TECHNIQUE











































































































































































TAOQUAL .730 1 .061 .926
(3.04)~ (2.81)- (4.48)-
[.070] [-128]
FYSB85 2.20 _ . _ • _
(4.28)"
[.212]
FYSB86 1.17 - _ - _
(3.71)~
[.113]
FYSB87 1.25 — — — — _ _ _ _
(4.07)-
[.120]
FYSB88 .223 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(.705)
[.022]
FYSB89 .411 - — — - _
(1.50)
[.040]
FFGE 1.15 -.118 -.116
(.841) (-1.07) (-.122)
[.111] [-.016]
LAMBDA1 2 -.615 .066 -.324
(-1.09) (1.04) (-.694)
[-.060] [-.045]
LAMBDA2 3 -.142 .083 - .029
(-.185) (1.30) (- .053)
[-.014] [- .004]
CHI -SQUARED LL 579.01- 157.05-
PREDICTION RATIO 89.2% 83.4%
ADJUSTED R- SQUARED .... .157
F- STATISTIC 13.45-
1 First figure is coefficient estimate, the t- statistic is in
parentheses, and the change in the probability associated with a one
unit increase in the explanatory variable obtained by multiplying the
coefficient by Px(l-P) is in brackets, where P is the percent of
observations predicted correctly.
2 LAMBDAl is the selection bias correction factor obtained from
the separation probit.
3 LAMBDA2 is the selection bias correction factor obtained from
the FFGE selection probit.
Significant at the .05 level.
Significant at the .01 level.
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The results obtained for each performance measure through
the dual selection Heckman approach, displayed in Table X,
were very similar to those obtained using the single selection
Heckman approach (see Tables VI, VII, and VIII, Chapter IV)
.
The coefficients for FFGE and the selection correction factor
(LAMBDA and LAMBDA2) , obtained from the FFGE selection probit,
in both the dual and single selection Heckman approaches for
each performance measure were virtually identical and
insignificant. Additionally, Table X revealed that the
selection correction factor (LAMBDA1) , obtained from the
separation probit, was insignificant in all three performance
models. The fact that the coefficient for FFGE remained
constant and the separation selection correction factor was
insignificant implies that accounting for the additional level
of selection (separation) , has no effect on the impact of FFGE
on performance. As discussed earlier, the ability to detect
and correct for selection bias is highly dependent on the
correct specification of the selection probit. Consequently,
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